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PREFACE

Following World War II the interests of great nations
converged in the Mediterranean. Seemingly a small and insig
nificant country, Greece

became the center of British and

American policies which created conditions that have almost
obscured actual events.

Contemporary Americans knew and re

sponded to the Greek situation as evidenced in Presidential
correspondence for the period.

These messages reflect both

the British and American postwar role, and successfully place
a small nation's people in deserved perspective.

In Greece,

a portion of the population desired active participation in
government. But their nationalist leaders expressed ideas and
employed rhetoric associated with accepted versions of Soviet
communism, and at the same time they pleaded for "Laocratia,"
or true democracy.

Intentions became increasingly misunder

stood, and the EAM movement, in the minds of British and Amer
ican policy makers, was tied to the Soviet Union*s desire to
dominate Greece.
and their own

Responding to believed Soviet intentions

national interests,

Britain and

the United

States came to support a reactionary and royalist Greek gov
ernment, which in its effort to maintain the status quo re
pressed civil liberties and thwarted democratic change.
Within Greece the EAM was mainly supported by common
people whose aim was to achieve

representative government.

To gain the viewpoint of ordinary American citizens, correspon

dence including letters and telegrams to Presidents Franklin
D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman were chosen for study. These
messages from obscure and influential individuals as well as
organizations,

offer new insight and knowledge on changing

American opinion as this nation adopted an increasingly inter
national role. Also, research incorporating Presidential cor
respondence against a background of foreign relations, pro
vides valuable

information on the

policy in a democracy.

relation of opinion and

The study begins in 1944, when mail

to Roosevelt expressed concern over British actions in Greece,
and the violation of the principle of self-determination for
liberated nations. But postwar events in the Balkans obscured
and confused liberal beliefs, and in addition, Greek-Americans
increasingly petitioned their government to support the aspi
rations of a royalist Greek government.

As a result ethnic

opinion influenced that of prominent Americans, and created
a climate sympathetic to economic assistance to Greece when
Truman made such a request.

The following chapters offer some

insight on what Americans thought concerning British and Amer
ican relations with Greece, and how they reacted to the an
nounced Truman plan.
At the outset, a caveat is in order. It is hoped this
paper will not be judged

on ideological grounds.

Certain

necessary words invoke inescapable images for the twentieth
century reader. Communism is such a word, but like democracy,
in actual practice it may take many forms. A word or a polit

ical system is not at issue here, but the ef forts of a people
of one country to achieve representative government and the
response of another people as they expressed their views to
their President.
I am indebted to Philip D. Lagerquist and the archi
vists of the Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri
whose kindness and professional acumen

aided my studies in

August 1974. Additional assistance was rendered in phone con
versations and by

correspondence with

William E. Emerson,

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. Providing
suggestions for research were

Professors L. S. Stavrianos,

Northwestern University; Melvin Small, Wayne State University
and Monroe Billington, New Mexico State University, who promptly
and kindly answered correspondence requesting their opinion
on aspects of this study. I would also like to thank the mem
bers of the Department of History,

University of Nebraska at

Omaha, especially Doctor William C. Pratt, as well as my hus
band and family for their patience and encouragement.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTIONi REVELANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL
MAIL AND POST WAR REALITIES

The President of the United States receives countless
letters and telegrams each day concerning domestic and for
eign policy.

Communications concerning Greece and written

to the White House from 1944 to 1947 are the subject of this
paper.^ Greek internal politics and that country's relations
with Britain and the United States dominated these messages
as citizens wrote to express approval, disapproval or alter
native policies.

Therefore, a background summarizing Greek

conditions and Anglo-American interests is included.
The volume of mail addressed to the President of the
United States has increased dramatically since the early years
of President Roosevelt's administration indicating a growing
literacy and awareness

on the part of the American people.

This trend reflected President Roosevelt's penchant for in2
viting the public's views.
Available statistical evidence

*The manuscript sources for this paper are the Roose
velt Papers
(Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park,
New
York) and the Truman Papers (Harry S. Truman Library, Inde
pendence, Missouri.
2

Leila A. Sussmann, "FDR and the White House Mail,"
Public Opinion Quarterly. XX (Spring 1956), 5-6, 10.

1

2

has been compiled to reflect

this increase and proves that

while the volume of mail leveled following the Roosevelt pres
idency, it did not decline significantly. The following sta
tistics also mark crisis periods during which White House mail
peaked numerically.

These figures are based on a ratio of

annual correspondence "per 10,000 literate adults* ,.3

Annual Ratio per

President

Period

Lincoln

Civil War

McKinley

1900

Wilson

World War I

47

Hoover

Prior to 1929

11 .8

Roosevelt

Midst of Depression

160

Roosevelt

Late 1930's

111

Truman

1948

104

Eisenhower

1952

103

Two crisis periods were

44

*

4 .7

examined in this study:

the Greek

Civil War which began December 3,1944, and ended in February
1945, and the initial stage of the Truman Doctrine when it was
introduced March 12, 1947, until it was implemented in May,
1947.

Leila A. Sussmann, "Mass Political Letter Writing in
America* The Growth of an Institution," Public Opinion Quar
terly . XXIII (Summer 1959), 204; for a recent study based on
White House mail,see Monroe Billington, "Civil Rights, Pres
ident Truman and the South." The Journal of Negro History.
LVIII (April 1973), 127-39.

3

Only a small portion of White House mail is actually
seen by the President.

Concise reports are made of the con

tents of incoming mail and sent to the Executive's secretary.
Occasionally,

individual letters are included.

Letters are

referred to the President when they represent a powerful in
dividual or group, or when they indicate a genuine feeling for
an event of interest to the President.

The mail room staff

is adept at recognizing pressure mail such as large batches
of mail instigated
granted the

by one organization.

This mail is not

respect accorded individual’s

correspondence,

unless the group represented is politically powerful.
records are made of the contents,

After

mail is carefully sorted

and sent to whatever executive department might best handle
4
the answer.
In comparing the results of polls and White House cor
respondence it must be stressed that no generalization can be
made on total correspondence received.

Representative mes

sages are retained, either in the original, or referred to by
memorandum. Messages or petitions from organizations present
an unknown numbers of concurring or dissenting individuals.
Memoranda refer to 'several letters, or in the case of one memo
during December, a petition with "thousands of signatures."
Therefore, conclusions can be drawn only on an evaluation of

^Ira R. T. Smith and Joe Alex Morris, "Dear Mr. Pres
ident" . . The Story of Fifty Years in the White House Mail
Room (New York* Julian Messener Inc. , 194.9), pp. 4, 13-14,
209-11; (Hereinafter cited as Smith, Dear Mr. President).

4

type of mail retained, not overall totals, or totals of indi5
viduals represented.
Since 1943 the Department of State has maintained a
separate desk to sort, tabulate,
dence concerning

and respond to correspon

a foreign country.

Correspondence, along

with public opinion polls, and accounts of the news media are
carefully compiled in statistical form to represent the pub
lic opinion on developing policy toward an area.^

Evidence

cannot support a proposition that public opinion influenced
the development of United States

foreign policy toward the

Eastern Mediterranean. While there is some evidence that pub
lic opinion imposes a limit to the extent of foreign policy,
it only briefly limited legislative or executive policy toward

Smith,
Dear Mr. President, pp. 187-91.
Total cor
respondence evaluated in this study is 247 documents which
include letters,
telegrams, memoranda and petitions.
It
should be noted that the significance to be attached to each
item varies. Obviously, a memorandum summarizing a number of
letters not retained or a telegram from an organization of
interest group may have more significance than a communica
tion from one individual.
^H. Schuyler Foster, "American Public Opinion and For
eign Policy," The Department of State Bulletin. XLI (November
30, 1959), 796-97?
(Hereinafter cited as Foster,
"Amer
ican Public Opinion" ) j see Barnard C. Cohen, "The Relationship
Between Public Opinion and the Foreign Policy Maker,” Public
Opinion and Historians* Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed.
Melvin Small (Detroit* Wayne State University Press, 1970),
pp. 70-79?
(Hereinafter cited as Small, Public Opinion and
Historians)? English historian A. V. Dicey found the American
policy-making process in the nineteenth century uninfluenced
by American public opinion, see A. V. Dicey, Lectures on the
Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England During the
Nineteenth Century
(Londont MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1930),
pp. 7-9, 60-61.

5

Greece.^
It is necessary to recognize that the effect of pub
lic opinion on the policy-making process is difficult to mea
sure.

At the same time correspondence to a President repre

sents only one segment of that opinion.
is White House mail?
paper reflects

Of what value then

The correspondence considered for this

changing American attitudes

during a period

when American foreign policy took a radically divergent course
o

from any previous period in its history.

One must assume

that those writing these

letters were influenced by strong
9
feeling, and were also to some extent informed.
According to
Gabriel A. Almond, only a small portion of the United States
public was informed on foreign affairs following World War I I .^

Small discusses the limits imposed by public opinion
in Melvin Small, "Historians Look at Public Opinion," Small,
Public Opinion and Historians, p. 15; see also Foster, "Amer
ican Public Opinion,.1’ The author contends public opinion im
posed no limits on the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill, ibid.. p. 798.
Q
Richard C. Snyder and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., Amer
ican Foreign Policy: Formulation. Principles, and Programs
(Rinehart and Co.,
Inc., 1954), p p . 6 6 4 - / 0 1 ; (Hereinafter
cited as Snyder, American Foreign Policy); see also Joseph
Marion Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (February 21 - June 5. 1947)
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc. , 1955), pp. 187-88;
(Hereinafter cited as Jones, Fifteen Weeks).
9
This writer read all retained correspondence con
cerning Greece from the Roosevelt and Truman Libraries for the
period October 1944 through 1952.
These letters displayed a
high degree of emotional, if not always intellectual, commit
ment ,
^Ga b r i e l A. Almond, The American People and Foreign
Policy (New Y o r k : Harcourt, Brace and Co. 1950) , p. 87 ; (Hereinafter cited as Almond, American People) .

6

If one accepts

his conclusion, the letters

sidered here are atypical.

initially con

A second consideration is that

correspondence concerning Greece reflects a changing image of
first Britain and

later a more marked change

in regard to

Soviet-American relations.^
The origins of an image one people may. have of another
12
country are intangible and difficult to measure.
The Amer
ican people were presented with the image of the Soviet Union
and Britain as allies during World War II.
were easily changed by subsequent events.

13

These images

This change might

have been wrought by any of the following three arguments or
a combination of these forces.

The acceptance of a wartime

ally was based on immediate need, not any permanent commitment.

14

The American public has commonly viewed foreigners

with a distrust

that on occasion m a y be easily a r o u s e d . ^

^ F o r a discussion of changing American attitudes re
garding Britain and Russia, see Almond, American People, pp.
96-97.
12

Harold R. Issacs,
"Sources for Images of Foreign
Countries," Small, Public Opinion and Historians, pp. 91-105;
see also Walter Uippmann., Public Opinion
(2d e d . ; New York*
The Free Press, 1949), pp. 3-20, 155-62.
13
Melvin Small "How We Learned to Love the Russians *
America Media and the Soviet Union During World War II," The
Historian, XXXVI (May 1974), 455-78; (Hereinafter cited as
Small, "HowWe Learned to Love the Russians); see also Almond,
American People, p. 96.
^Almond. American People, pp. 87-99.
15

Melvin Small, "Historians Look at Public Opinion,"
Small, Public Opinion and Historians, p. 22,

7

Reinforced with
exercises
posals.

16

the above two conditions

tremendous influence

the policy-maker

simply by initiating pro-

These factors must be considered in evaluating the

changing mood of correspondence concerning Greece.
The news media are an additional impetus to opinion
formation.

Radio, as well as reports of columnists and news

correspondents are included by the executive officials as in
dicators of public opinion.

These news stories are not con

sidered representative of mass public opinion, but are a re
flection of elite opinion. The State Department includes news
stories as part
citizens.

of what constitutes the

views of ordinary

State Department tabulation of all known opinion

suggests that the purpose is to influence public reaction to
a previously desired c o u r s e . ^
Correspondents of Greek origin are evaluated separately
where recognition is possible. Where sentiment toward Greece
existed among Americans of other origins,

it was generally

romanticized. Greece was seen as the birthplace of democracy
and a veritable museum of the antiquities of western civiliza-

Theodore J. Lowie, "Making Democracy Safe for the
World: National Politics and Foreign Policy,” Domestic Sources
of Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free
Press, 19671, pp. 315-23.
i7
This course is suggested in Jones, Fifteen Weeks.
pp. 174-76; see also Barnard C. Cohen, The Press* and Foreign
Policy (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press,
1963), p. 133; Snyder, American Foreign Policy pp. 525-26.

8
1o

tion,

Rarely was it viewed in its modern context.

The

Greek-American incorporated this sentiment, with that of the
"Megali Idea” or the dream of a "Greater Greece, " This "Greater
Greece" would include territories once
Byzantine Empire.

incorporated in the

The "Megali Idea" of territorial achieve

ment has had a tremendous emotional appeal to Greeks; those
that immigrated to America kept its ideals before succeeding
generations both by means of the Greek Orthodox Church and in
such Greek schools as were established. As will be seen, the
"Megali Idea" was probably the one belief capable of unifying
people of Greek Origin, and subjugated rational evaluation of
the Greek national situation.

19

To avoid oversimplification it has been necessary to
qualify the importance of public opinion and that portion of
opinion represented here.

This correspondence may only be

safely taken as a reflection of changing American attitudes,
while remembering that those
tiple forces.

attitudes were shaped by mul

Some of these forces, such as news reports,

executive initiative,

and ethnic origins

Other impetus to opinion and its

may be measured.

effect remain subjects of

^ L . S, Stavrianos, "*fhe Best Damn Government Since
Pericles,*" The Nation. 217 (October 22, 1973), 405-6.
19

Recent events regarding Greek and Turkish attempts
to control Cyprus demonstrates the appeal of the "Megali
Idea;" tor historic evaluation see Theodore Saloutos, "The
Greeks in the United States." The South Atlantic Quarterly.
XLIV
(January 1945), 73;
(Hereinafter cited as Saloutos,
"Greeks in the United States."

9

speculation.
Presidential correspondence

can only be understood

against the background of political realities which opposed
the avowed sentiment stated in the Atlantic Charter. As World
War II came to a close Greece was a country torn by political
factions.

This reality would complicate the Greek people's

attempt to determine their own form of government.

Parlia

mentary politicians excluded from government since the Metaxas
dictatorship of 1936

were determined to

exercise power in

postwar Greece. The most influential of the prewar political
parties were the Liberals and the Populists. Greece also had
an active extreme

left represented by the

Greek Communist

Party or the KKE. Driven underground by the Metaxas dictator
ship, the KKE emerged in 1941 after the German occupation as
the only organized Greek political group and joined with the
Agrarian party to form the National Liberation Front or the
EAM.

The EAM and its military arm, the ELA S , had two stated

aims: to drive the Nazis from Greece, and establish a govern
ment representative of the Greek people.
tional appeal,

the EAM became a

Unique in its na

coalition of the Communist

Party, the Agrarian Party, the Socialist Party, the Union of
Popular Democracy, and the trade unions. The other two resis
tance groups of any importance developed during the war years
and were regional in character and based on the personal pop
ularity of their leaders. They were the EDES, led by General

10
20

Napoleon Zervas , and the EKKA, under Colonel Deraetrois Psarros .
Greece represented

a classic example

of Barrington

Moore's thesis of a people's attempt

to achieve true demo21
cratic government in the twentieth century.
The Populists

were completely reactionary and represented a ruling elite.
Liberals represented the merchantilist and some intellec
tual interests, and., by 1944 were engrossed in their own at
tempts to create a political hegemony.

A Liberal-Populist

coalition formed when the two were threatened by the emerging
political power of the EAM. This coalition was determined to
22
create an "authoritarian semi-parliamentary government."
The EAM failed to create representative government in Greece,
because both Britain and the United States repressed nation
alist aims in the years 1944 to 1949, with the acquiescence
of a right wing government.

Moore also contends a threat of

foreign intervention serves

to maintain a government semi-

To

L. S. Stavrianos,
"The Greek National Liberation
Front (EAM): A Study in Resistance Organization and Adminis
tration," Journal of Modern History. XXIV (December 1952),
42-43? see also "Greek Political Parties," The Economist.
CXLVII (December 23, 1944), 837-38; Stephen G. Xydis, Greece
and The Great Powers 1944-1947: Prelude to the "Truman Doc
trine" (Thessoloniki. Greece: Institute for Balkan Studies,
1963), p. 32;
(Hereinafter cited as Xydis,
Greece and The
Great Powers.)
21

Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), pp. 432-52, 438 fn. 4; (Hereinafter cited as Moore, Social Origins).

22

Quoted in ibid.. p. 438.

11

democratic in form.

23

That threat was represented in Greece

by international communism. Churchill referred to the EAM/ELAS
as "Communist

/ s_Jt rebels" and "mutineers"

in his speech
o/
before the House of Commons, December 8, 1944.
His views

reflected the constant cry of the Greek right both during the
years of exile, and in Greece's postwar period.
were eventually adopted by the United States.

These views

25

Motivated by her interest in India, Britain as early
as 1815 determined to contain Russia and block that country's
26
influence in the Mediterranean and Asia.
In 1944 Britain
retained her historic fear of Russian control of the Mediter
ranean by way of the Turkish Straits.
23

A British-controlled

Moore, Social Origins, p. 439.

^Stfinston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Triumph
and Tragedy (6 V o l s . ; Boston* Houghton Mifflin C o . ,1953), VI,
293-95; (Hereinafter cited as Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy);
for a text that takes the view that international Communism
was suppressed in Greece,
see Edgar O'Ballance,
The Greek
Civil Wart 1944-1949 (London* Faber and Faber, 19661, p^ 1~5*
(Hereinafter cited as O'Ballance, Greek Civil W a r .
25

L. S . Stavrianos, "Greece's Other History. " New York
Review, XVI (July 17, 1971), 13; see also L. S. Stavrianos,
Greece * American Dilemma and Opportunity (Chicago * Henry Regenery C o ., 1952), pp. 113-15, 120, 122; (Hereinafter cited as
Stavrianos, Greece* American Dilemma); Leland Stowe, Whi1e
Time Remains (New York* Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), pp. 4 3 2 4 4 47"5 (Hereinafter cited as Stowe, While Time Remains).
26

G. D. Clayton,
Britain and the Eastern Question*
Missolonghi to Gallipoli (London* University of London Press,
Ltd".", 1971), p p . 33-35, 244; see also J. A. R. Marriott,' The
Eastern Question* An Historical Study in European Diplomacy
(3d ed., rev; Oxford* Clarendon Press, 1924), pp. 209, 21819.

12

India was still a reality, and the Suez route to India was
27
paramount to British interests.
Equally important, Middle
Eastern oil was a necessity to British industry and for the
maintenance of the British Navy. The English historian, John
Strachey, calls this "The Empire of Oil,'"

and considers it

Britain's last and most financially successful acquisition.
It consisted of areas in Iraq, Palestine, Syria, and Jordan
which came under British control at the end of World War I.
British influence in Iran preceded these gains.

28

Bordering

the Mediterranean Sea, Greece became crucial as a result of
the proximity of that country to the Turkish Straits and the
Middle East.

Britain's historic interests in India and the

modern need for Middle Eastern oil intensified her desire to
contain Russia in

the twentieth century,

impetus to involvement in Greece.

and provided the

29

On October 9, 1944, Churchill and Stalin agreed to a
temporary division of the Balkans. By this agreement, Britain
was allowed a free hand in Greece. Churchill's expressed fear
27

John Howes Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobia in
Great Britain: A Study of the Interaction of Policy and Opinion
(Cambridge» Harvard University Press, 1950)^ pp. 62-64, /l-^6 ,
268-69.
o o

John Strachey, The End of Empire (New York: Random
House, 1959), pp. 154-55; Strachey suggests the Soviet Union
and the United States inherited the British Empire, see ibid. ,
p p . 2 7 7, 2 93.
29

Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, pp. 26-28; Xydis
makes clear the Greek government in exile 01941-1944) realized
its country's geographic importance to British interests.

13

was that Soviet

troops would come to dominate

Europe upon liberation of that area.

all Eastern

Thus an Anglo-Soviet

agreement was initially made at Churchill’s request.

Brit-

ian's actions in Greece during Decemnber 1944, offered Stalin
a pretext for his country's subsequent Balkan policy.

31

While

the Soviet Union cannot be absolved from violating the prin
ciple of self-determination for- nations, initial Balkan inter
vention was British-instigated, and created a postwar AngloSoviet spheres of influence policy which inaugurated postwar
unilateral action.

Franklin Roosevelt acquiesced when Royal

Hellenic and British troops imposed a British dominated gov32
ernment in Greece in December 1944.
A number of factors
motivated the acquiescence. They include his desire to maintain
friendly
tect

terms with

the

Britain and

his determination

United states from Balkan involvement.

to pro

Perhaps

30

Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy t pp. 226-27; Herbert
Feis, Churchill Rossevelt Stalin: The War They Waged and the
Peace They Sought (Princeton, New Jerseys Princeton University
Press, 1957), p p . 339-40; (Hereinafter cited as P'eis, Churchill
Roosevelt Stalin.)
31

Churchill acknowledged that he could not condemn
Soviet intervention in Rumania and Bulgaria because the Soviet
Union had allowed him a free hand in Greece by the Anglo-Soviet
Agreement of October 9, 1944, see Churchill, Triumph and Trag
edy p. 420.
32

. . .
The Greek government supported by Britain in the
Civil War of December, 1944, was British-instigated in May,
1944, see William Hardy McNeill, American, Britain and Russia»
Their Cooperation and Conflict 1941-46 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p"i 422.

14

even his lack of physical vigor should be considered.
velt allowed Greece's future

33

Roose

to be decided long before the

Yalta Conference met in February 1945 to consider among other
r\§
topics the status of small nations.
Between the liberation of Greece and the passage of
the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill, the United States almost completely
revised its foreign policy.

In 1944 the principles of the

Atlantic Charter, agreed to by Franklin Roosevelt and Winston
Churchill in 1941, proclaiming belief in the self-determination
of liberated nations were accepted by many Americans.

These

Americans hoped an effective world organization would become
a reality.

35

Following World War II, the Atlantic Charter

principles and a strong United Nations were shattered within
three years, as officials of the United States came to believe
in the necessity for unilateral action. Joseph Jones, writing
of the events leading to United States intervention in Greece,
stated:

"what we had thought were British chestnuts were in

36
fact our own."

World War II made the necessity for a con-

33

Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins : An Inti
mate History (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p~, 838.
841 -42 ; (Hereinafter cited as Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins):
see also "FDR’s Conspiracy of Silence." Time^ 104 (September
16, 1974), 22-23.
o/
Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, pp. 64-73.
35
Snyder, American Foreign Policy.

pp. 51-52, 789,

793-94.
3

Quoted in Jones, Fifteen Weeks, p. 188.

15

stant source of petroleum a reality to the American govern
ment. According to government studies based on domestic indus
trial and general public consumption, known oil reserves were
considered inadequate

to maintain a large Navy

or provide

adequate petroleum in case of war. By the wars end, reserves
were expected to last less than two decades.

As early as

February 5, 1944, Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes
maintained that the United States would necessarily have to
develop an active naval interest in the Mediterranean in order
to protect access to the termination point of Middle East pipe
lines.

38

James Forrestal as Secretary of the Navy, and later

as Secretary of Defense, concurred with this view.

39

Through

out 1946, the United States naval presence in the Mediterranean
increased, until by September 1946 a permanent Mediterranean
fleet became a reality. This naval growth was to protect oil
supplies and

the United States European interests.

40

The

„
Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers. p. 578, fn. 24;
Halford L. Hoskins, Middle East Oil in United States Foreign
Policy. Public Affairs Builetin No. 89 ^Washington, D. C . *
The Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, Dec
ember 1950;, p. 36; (Hereinafter cited as Hoskins, Middle East
Oil.
38

Ickes as quoted in Hoskins. Middle East Oil, p. 94.

8Q

Ibid.. p. 36, fn. 41; see also Walter Millis, ed.,
The Forrestal Diaries (New York* The Viking Press, 1951),
p. 357; (Hereinafter cited as Millis, Forrestal Diaries).
40

Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers. p. 159; see also
Millis, Forrestal Diaries, pp. 144, 1?1, T57, 211.
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Trans-Arabian oil line proposed in 1946 further intensified
United States

interest in the Mid-East and Mediterranean,

which dated from the first United States oil company conces
sions in 1 9 2 7 . ^
Postwar. Soviet activities concerning control of the
Turkish Straits further increased United States interests.
The United States felt reasonably safe as long as the British
navy dominated the Mediterranean Sea, but as Britain's post
war power waned, off icials found control of the Mediterranean
crucial.

British "chestnuts" had indeed become those of the

United States.

American policy became that of Britain; to

contain the Soviet Union and develop a naval hegemony in the
Mediterranean. Friendly governments in Greece and Turkey were
crucial to this interest, but partially as a result, SovietAmerican relations polarized leading to cold war.
Truman's memoirs
nations of Europe.

indicate sympathy for

the small

Both he and his close advisor, Chief of

Staff Admiral William D. Leahy,

felt Soviet intransigence at

the 1945 Potsdam Conference initiated cold war conflict, and
made United States protection of small nations such as Greece
and Turkey inevitable.

Their chief criticism of Stalin at

^Hoskins, Middle East Oil, pp. 76, 94.
/0
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman. Vol
Two; Years of Trial and Hope (2 Vpls.; Garden City, New York;
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1956), IIj 96-97, 99-100; (Herein
after cited as Truman, Years of Trial); see also D. F. Fleming
The Cold War and Its Origins : 1917-1960 (London; George Allen
and Unwin Ltd. , 1961,) pp. '440-42
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that time was based

on his nation's activities
in Poland,
43
Rumania and Bulgaria.
In both Rumania and Bulgaria, Stalin
was exercising authority granted the Soviet Union by the Anglo Soviet agreement of October 1944. Sentiment clouded the real
ities of the internal Greek political situation, as it equally
clouded the pragmatics of British and United States involve
ment in Greece.

Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (New York: William
Morrow and Co., Inc., 1973), p. 343;
(Hereinafter cited as
Truman, Harry S. Truman); see also William D. Leahy, I Was
There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents
Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at
the T i m e , forward by President Truman (New York: Whittlesey
House McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1950), pp. 428-29; Truman,
Years of Trial, p. 106; Robert G. Kaiser, Cold Winter. Cold
War (New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1974), p~, 11; (Hereinafter cited as Kaiser, Cold Winter); American revisionist
historians take an opposing view, see Small, "How We Learned
to Love the R u s s i a n s P r o f e s s o r Small identif ies the leading
revisionist historians asWilliamA. Williams, Gar Alperovitz,
Gabriel Kolko, Walter LaFaber,
Lloyd Gardner, and Barton J.
Bernstein in ibid.. p. 455, fn. 1.

CHAPTER II

AMERICAN REACTION
TO BRITISH INTERVENTION IN GREECE

Press reports of Allied troops firing on Greek civil
ians astonished Americans in December of 1944.

Greece was a

popular wartime ally, but events rooted in the Greek political
past and a British effort to create a sympathetic government
in the Mediterranean coincided to create a dismaying situa
tion.

Because of wartime censorship,

aware of relations between the

few Americans were

exiled Greek government and

Great Britain, but news accounts favorable to the resistance
fighters in Greece were common.

In the coming confrontation

between the chief resistance group, t h e E A M , a n d British sup
ported royalist Greek forces, Americans favored the EAM, as
evidenced in correspondence to President Roosevelt.^
Expressing exceptional knowledge of the British, the Royal
Hellenic and the EAM triangle, Basil J. Vlavianos, publisher
and editor of The National Herald, a Greek newspaper located
in New York City, wrote Roosevelt that he feared an "unpopular
government" would be imposed on the Greek people by the "fas
cist methods"

of those unable

to retain political power.

^All unpublished manuscripts in this chapter are from
Roosevelt Papers (The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park,
New York); (Hereinafter cited by description, date and file
number only).
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Vlavianos asked for a def initive American policy which objected
to any British-imposed political system, and also requested
that the true background of British actions respecting Greece
2
be published.
The National Herald and its editor were considered of
sufficient importance to warrant a Presidential reply.

Dem

ocratic National Committee member Charles Olson requested a
Presidential Statement for publication in The National Herald.
In referring to that paper he states: "his paper represents
the liberal

group . . . and carries the majority of Greek
3
Americans with it." President Roosevelt wrote Mr. Vlavianos
for publication:
It is the further desire of our government that the Greek
people who have fought so valiantly for democratic ideals
will be able to exercise, as soon as possible, the right
of all democratic people and choose freely for themselves
the form of government under which they will live.
4
Roosevelt's phrase that the

Greek people should be able to

choose their own government "as soon as possible," had little

2

Letter, Basil J. Vlavianos to Roosevelt, OF 4675-Z,
October 14, 1944.
3
Quoted from memorandum to James Barnes from Charles
Olson, PPF 772, October 17, 1944. It should be noted that both
ethnic groups and organized labor are considered to have more
influence on the policy-making process than their numerical
numbers might warrant, see Bernard C. Cohen, The Influence of
Non-Governmental Groups on Foreign Policy Making, forward by
Max F. Millikan
(World Peace Foundation, Center of Interna
tional Studies: Princeton University, 1959), II, 6-8,
^Quoted from letter, Roosevelt to BasilJ . Vlavianos,
PPF 772, October 19, 1944.
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relation to British wartime policies or the impending political
crisis.
A crisis

developed because

Winston Churchill was

determined to return King George II to the Greek throne, which
was apparently contrary to the wishes of a majority of the Greek
people who viewed with suspicion

the King's past actions.

George II, fearing the demands of an emerging democratic move
ment within Greece, had allowed John Metaxas to assume dicta
torial powers in 1936.

Under the Metaxas dictatorship there

was no meeting of Parliament, civil liberties were curtailed,
and dissenters were imprisoned or exiled.

Public works were

introduced similar to those instigated in Nazi Germany, but the
fascist-oriented regime was unpopular with the Greek people.
Italy invaded Greece in October of 1940. Violent Greek resis
tance collapsed with the subsequent invasion by German forces
in April 1941. Metaxas died in January 1941. The newly formed
government fleeing the Nazi invasion was accompanied by a King
formally associated with an unpopular dictatorship.^

Howard K. Smith, The State of Europe (New York* Alfred
A. Knopf, 1949), p. 232; (Hereinafter cited as Smith, State of
Europe); for a study reflecting official British opinion see
Sir Llewellyn Woodward. British Foreign Policy in the Second
World War
(London* Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1971),
383-439; (Hereinafter cited as Woodward, British Foreign Policy.)
^Edward S. Forster, A Short History of Modern Greece»
1821-1956. rev. and enl. by Douglas Dakin (3d e d . ; New York*
Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), pp. 190, 196-97, 214; see also
L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York* Holt, Rine
hart and Wins to n, 1958 )7 pp"! 670-76.
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A proposed American visit by George II in 1942 illus
trates that Roosevelt felt Greek-Americans disliked the Greek
King.

In a memorandum to acting Secretary of State, Sumner

Welles , which in turn would be presented to the Greek Minister,
Roosevelt advised that George II should dress as Commander-inChief of the Greek Army and avoid the appearance of a head of
state by wearing a plain army uniform. Because of its resis
tance to Mussolini and Hitler,

the Greek Army was popular in
7
the United States. Roosevelt believed that George II was not.
The Royal Hellenic government spent the war years in
exile in Cairo, Egypt, while George II divided his time between
Egypt and London. Meanwhile in Greece, the EAM which had be
come a strong nationalistic movement spent the war years in
8
active resistance against the Nazis.
In 1944, the United
States Ambassador to Greece, Lincoln MacVeagh, described the
EAM as a coalition of Greek forces which opposed the King's
9
return.
An Office of Strategic Services report made soon
Elliott Roosevelt, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters. 19281945. forward by Eleanor Roosevelt (New Y o r k : Duell, Sloan and
Pearce, 1950), II, 1308.
8
Churchill admitted the effectiveness of the guerrilla
resistance in July 1943; see Winston S. Churchill, The Second
World War : Closing The Ring (6 V o l s .; Boston: Houghton-Mifflin
C o ., 1951), V, 464; (Hereinafter cited as Churchill, Closing;
The Ring); see also L. S. Stavrianos. Greece: American Dilemma,
pp. 65, 92-93.
q
.
United States Department of State, Foreign Relations
of the United States (1944), Vol. V,
"The Near East, South
Asia, and Africa; The Far East," Pubn. 7859 (1965), p. 145;
(Hereinafter cited as FRUS (1944), V).
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after liberation recognized the EAM as a purely nationalistic
movement.*^

Yet, Churchill maintained that a Communist con

trolled EAM would seize power in Greece.**

To the contrary,

there is documentary evidence to prove that the EAM, which had
welcomed the British landing, was dismayed when open warfare
broke out. Records of the KKE Central Committee were obtained
by British Intelligence in Athens in December 1944, and prove
the EAM had no plan for armed revolution.

12

British determination to establish a right wing gov
ernment in Greece predated liberation by at least a year, In
the fall of 1943, a New Zealander, Captain Donald Scott of the
British Armed Forces, made contact with the German authorities
in Athens.

His exact orders are unknown but his mission was

an apparent attempt to enlist German support in establishing
an anti-left wing government in Athens in the event of German
13
withdrawl.
■■■■

.j■■w

John 0. Iatrides, Revolt
munist
"Second Round.M 1944^1945
Princeton University Press, 1972),
after cited as Iatrides. Revolt in

in Athens * The Greek Com
(Princeton,
New Jersey *
App. F. 324-19; (Herein
Athens).

**Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 287.
12

Iatrides, Revolt in Athens. pp. 149-51; the originals
of these records are on file at the British Embassy, Athens,
see ibid.. p. 151, fn. 27; see also George D. Kousoulas, Rev
olution and Defeat*
The Story of the Greek Communist Party
(London* Oxford University Press, 1965); Kousoulas * thesis is
that the EAM was the tool of the KKE, and was determined to
establish a Communist dictatorship by revolution; he admits
the lack of documentary evidence to support his contentions,
see I b i d .. p. 201.
13

Iatrides, Revolt In Athens, pp. 41-43.
i
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In April

1944, the armed forces stationed with the

Greek government in exile in Cairo, Egypt, demanded a more dem
ocratic government by asking that the resistance forces within
Greece be represented in the government in exile.

The British

troops ruthlessly suppressed what they considered a "mutiny.”
An estimated 15,000 soldiers and sailors

involved were still

imprisoned in the fall of 1945. Due to rigid British censor
ship the "Gario Mutiny ” was not publicized in either the United
States or Britain. Cario troops were hand-picked for royalist
sympathies and from this group the Greek Mountain Brigade was
14
formed.
The loyalist Mountain Brigade was assigned to Athens
by British order and arrived November 8, 1944.

The Mountain

Brigade's presence was to be the primary cause of the outbreak
of the Greek Civil War the following December.
In the beginning of May

15

1944, the first overtures for

a spheres of influence policy in the Balkans were made by the
British Ambassador to Moscow who approached the Soviet author
ities with the suggestion that Britain be given a free hand in
Greece. In exchange the Soviet Union could direct the affairs
of Rumania.

The Soviet government would agree only if

United States would approve.

the

When informed of the British

^Stowe, While Time Remains, pp. 248-49, 264; see also
National Liberation Front (EAM) White Book: May. 1944 - March
194 5 (New York: Greek American Council, 1945), p. 17; (Hereinafter cited as EAM White Book).
^ EAM White Book, pp. 17, 22-26.
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plan, United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull rejected
it as a spheres of influence policy in the B a l k a n s . ^

Chur

chill finally won Roosevelt's approval for a trial period to
last three months, not to exceed the war period, and informed
the Soviet Union of this acquiescence.^ To insure his posi
tion, Churchill requested a conference with Stalin to be held
in October 1944.

Arriving in Moscow on October 9, Churchill

sealed Greece's future political structure that same evening.
In reference to the Balkans he said to Stalin*

"Don't let us

get at cross purposes in small w a y s ," and of fered Soviet dom
ination in Rumania in exchange for Greece. Stalin immediately
agreed, but Churchill's reply indicates his moral qualifica
tions to what had been decided*
At
if
to
us

length I said, "Might it not be thought rather cynical
it seemed we had disposed of these issues, so fateful
millions of people, in such an offhand manner? Let
burn the paper." "No, you keep it," said Stalin.
18
Churchill reported that the United States Ambassador

to Moscow, Averell Harriman, was present at this meeting. He
was not, nor did he have a clear understanding of the agree-

1

Basil Collier, The Lion and The Eagle* British and
Anglo-American Strategy. 1900-1950 (New York* G.
Putnam's
Sons, 1972j , p”! 353? see also Churchill, Closing The Ring, p.
708; Feis, Churchill Roosevelt Stalin, pp. 339-40.
^F eis , Churchill Roosevelt Staiin. pp. 341-43.
1o
Quoted from Churchill,

227-28.

Triumph and Tragedy, pp.
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ment.

19

An official communique to Roosevelt, October 10, made

scant reference to the Balkans merely stating*

"We have to

consider the best way of reaching an agreed policy about the
Balkan countries, including Hungary and Turkey.

20

The Anglo-

Russian arrangement was not known to the EAM, nor is it clear
at what point the Royal Hellenic government was informed.

21

Prior to liberation, delegates from the resistance
forces within Greece met in Lebanon with representatives of
the exiled Greek government.

George Papandreou, who was se

lected conference chairman by the British,

and the British

Ambassador Sir Reginald Leeper dominated the meeting.
twenty-eight

delegates signed the

All

Lebanon Agreement which

provided for a coalition government of right and left.

Yet,

Papandreou had no intention of adhering to the Lebanon agree
ment, which included EAM representation in the government.
19

F e i s , Churchill Roosevelt Stalin, p. 448, fn. 7;
for Harriman's
report of the Moscow Conference,
see U. S .
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States
(1944), Vol. IV, "Europe," Pubn. 8067 (1966), pp. 1009-1010;
(Hereinafter cited as FRUS (1944), IV).

20 Stalin1s

Correspondence With Churchill.
Attlee.
Roosevelt and Truman 1941-1945
(New York* EL P. Dutton and
C o ., Inc., 1958).
There is no reference in this volume to the
Anglo-Soviet percentage agreement of October 9, 1944.
21

Dominique Eudes, The Kapetanios* Partisan and Civil
War In Greece. 1934-1949. trans. by John Howe (New York and
London* Monthly Review Press, 1972;,
p. 167;
(Hereinafter
cited as Eudes, Kapetanios); see also Xydis, Greece and The
Great Powers. As the most, exhaustive study of relations be
tween the Royal Hellenic government and Great Britain, this
study does not mention when the Greek government was informed
of the Anglo-Soviet agreement.
Xydis remarks that Churchill
armed with this agreement was in a position to suppress re
volt, see jbid.. p. 62.
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During the Lebanon Conference he asked the EDES delegate if
his forces could destroy the EAM; if not, Papandreou implied
22
that the British would.
These were the political realities
that preceded Greek liberation.
In October

1944,

as German forces

withdrew from

Greece, British troops landed to guarantee the survival of a
British formed Greek government under the leadership of Papan23
dreou.
Unsure of British intentions, the EAM which controlled Athens, welcomed the British landing.

24

A young Amer

ican lieutenant witnessed the Greek liberation and his letter
describing events was sent by his mother to Roosevelt.
message provides

a vivid description of

This

the economic and

political situation*
Try to imagine Cincinnati with no lights, gas, or water,
or no telephone or street cars,
nine out of ten shops
closed and empty - and the dollar bill worth about three
for a penny. In addition - all railroads, shipping, and
factories at a standstill and - almost full unemploy
ment. . . .
In reference to the political situation, the "right" referred
to is the government of George Papandreou and the "left" is
the EAM*
the "left" has a definite economic and social program,
_

Iatrides, Revolt in Athens. pp. 63-64; Xydis, Greece
and The Great Powers, p. 56; Eudes, Kapetanios. pp. 130-37;
for MacVeagh's report on British direction of the Conference
see FRUS (1944), V, 106-7.
^Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 283-85.
0/

Eudes, Kapetanios. pp. 171-73.
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the only program of the "right" is to attack the "left"
and bemoan any possible material sacrifice. . . . The
tragedy is that the local Communist program is slightly
less radical than the New Deal,
but the damned fools
call themselves "Communists". . . .
25
As reported by American news correspondents such as
Leland Stowe, George Weller, and Richard Mowrer, the EAM co
operated with the British from liberation to December 3. Stowe
reported that the EAM welcomed

the British and removed its

armed forces from the Athens area at British Commander General
Ronald Scobies's request.

26

George Weller traveled through

out central Greece and the Peloponnesos in November and inter
viewed British
cities.

military commanders

in a majority of major

Every commander praised the EAM for its aid in the

administration of the countryside.

At the same time, George

Weller also reported fascists and f ormer German collaborators
remained at large in Athens,
and were incorporated in the
27
Royal Hellenic army.
Richard Mowrer wrote of his disgust
for the rich of Athens, describing constant parties which were
held in the Psyhico and Kolonaki sections of the city. Mowrer
attended one of these gatherings and reported the people and
Quote from memorandum to Grace Tully, OF 4847, Jan
uary 11, 1945. The attached letter is dated October 26, 1944
and describes the preceding two weeks in Greece.
26
Stowe, While Time Remains, pp. 250-51. Panos Morphopoulos reported EAM/ELAS was peaceful and cooperating with
the British, see "Greece The Struggle For Power." The New Re
public . Ill (November 6, 1944), p. 590.
27

Chicago Daily Ne w s . November 9, 1944, p. 2\ November
24, 1944, p . 2; Nov ember 2 7, 1944, p. 2.

28

the areas were untouched by war.

Yet these same people com

plained heatedly of their hardships and

the threat of Com

munism.. Mowrer believed that 85 percent of the Greek people
28
supported the EAM.
Mowrer also commented on the activities
of extreme right wing groups called X-itesf

which operated

under the leadership of Colonel George Grivas, and were made
up of former Nazi collaborators and ardent monarchists.

The

X-ites operated freely in Athens from the time of the British
29
landing.
Howard K. Smith, in writing of these events between
October 4 and December 3, 1944, stated : "One is forced to con
clude that the British were determined to break EAM and install
in power the discredited monarchy and its blindly vengeful
30
rightist supporters."
The following sequence of events sup
ports

Smith's contention.

On November 8, 1944,

Churchill

advised his military commander in the Mediterranean to reinforce Athens, as a Communist take-over was imminent.

31

On

that same day, the royalist Mountain Brigade arrived in Athens .
On December 1, Scobie ordered that the EAM be immediately dis
armed. This order was refused by the EAM unless the Mountain

,

,

Chicago Daily N ew s. October 30, 1944, p. 4.
^ I b i d . . November 4, 1944, p. 2.
30
Smith, State of Europe, p. 232.
^Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 287.
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Brigade was also demobilized, Greek Premier Papandreou orig
inally agreed, but then withdrew this agreement under British
direction.

As a result, the EAM Cabinet Ministers resigned

in protest to British intervention in the internal af fairs of
32
Greece.
This resignation precipated a government crisis,
but not a civil war as the EAM
law.

continued to act within the

On December 1, the EAM announced it would disband when

the Mountain Brigade was demobilized. This announcement also
asked why former

German collaborators

were not brought to

trial, and expressed the fear that George II would be restored
to the throne by the Greek right,, Following the announcement,
the EAM asked for and was granted a civil permit for a peace
ful demonstration to be held Sunday, December 3, in Syntagma
Square, Athens.

33

An abundance of historical

data proves the EAM did

not start the actual fighting on December 3, at the Syntagma
demonstration.

Roosevelt's correspondence files contain as

accurate and poignant an account as can be found in this eye
witness report sent to the White Houses
The main square was covered with police armed with tommy
guns and a few British armored cars strategically placed.
T7

EAM White Book, pp. 34, 36-37 j see also Stowe. While
Time Remains, pT 249.
.3.3

EAM White Book, p. 37, 41.
The permit to demon
strate was withdrawn by Papandreou, under orders from British
General Ronald M. Scobie late on December 2, too late for the
Athens people to be told* see also Stowe, While Time Remains.
p. 252.
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Promptly at 11,
the parade appeared several thousand
strong, unarmed. and led by women and children carrying
United Nations flags crying "freedom and Democracy," It
was perfectly orderly.
The police tried to hold them
back at first with fists and rifle butts, but they broke
thru and reformed the parade.
I was sure that trouble
had been averted when - suddenly - evidently by prear
ranged signal - the police dropped back in a line and
opened fire.
The crowd went down like a pack of cards.
As soon as they started to get up,
the police fired
again.
Finally the foremost of the crowd managed to
crawl into a sunken garden, - that is,
all but about
fif teen, - chiefly women and kids under f if teen who didn't
get up - and the flags lay in the gutter, .
A few minutes later British tanks appeared and ma
neuvered in such a way as to protect - police quarters!
I was almost actively sick - at what
I'd seen and the
implications of what was to come I can't - so won't go
into the whole story, but it's the first instance I know
of a counter revolution being started when there was no
revolution to counter.
34
In addressing

Parliament, Churchill

described the

beginning of the Greek Civil War as "a well-organized plot by
which ELAS should march down to Athens and seize it by armed
:3S
force and establish a reign of terror."
John Menard, of
Detroit, Michigan disagreed with Churchill's views, and his
letter placed a different interpretation on British actions
Q/
Memorandum to Grace Tully, OF 4847, attached letter
dated January 11, 1945.
For other accounts on the outbreak
of the Civil War, see EAM White Book, p. 41; FR-US (1944), V,
148; Stowe, While Time Remains, p. 253-54. Dimitri Kessel of
Life took pictures proving unarmed men, women and children
were fired upon, see "Civil War Breaks Out in Greece," Life.
Vol. 17
(December 25, 1944), 20-23;
see also Stavrianos,
Greece: American Dilemma. The author quotes the eyewitness
report of the December 3 events as reported by British officer,
A. Byford Jones. Jones witnessed an unarmed crowd being fired
upon point blank.
The fire was not returned, see i b i d ., pp.
131-32.
35

Winston Churchill as quoted in Stowe,
Remains. p. 250.

While Time
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in Greece*
Some of those my neighbors brought me the news paper
this morning dealing with Mr. Churchill, his bankers mixed
up with the Greek government and the same banks are the
main cause for the shooting of our faithful allies in
Greece who for FOUR LONG YEARS fought Hitler's armies
and when they had them annihilated then Churchill sends
his army there to tell the Greek people who he wants for
their leader and who for their king. . . .
36
The British and Royal Hellenic armies were unable to
achieve military victory. The savage street fighting provoked
on December 3 continued for thirty-three days.

Heavy artil

lery ,mor tars, and planes were employed which almost demolished
37
the poorer sections of Athens.
While the British enjoyed
strategic superiority in their control of the Athens Airport,
and the port of Piraeus,

they encountered great difficulty

keeping the roads open into the center of the city, where their
control was never more than a few blocks surrounding the Hotel
Grand Bretagne,
British Embassy.

including Syntagma Square,
38

General Scobie's forces

Indian, and Royalist Greek Troops.

39

and the nearby
were British,

In addition, known Nazi

1ft
Letter, John Menard to Roosevelt, OF 206-A, December
13, 1944.
^ EAM White Book, pp. 68-69.
^ ^FRUS (1944), V, 146;
see also Harold Macmillian,
The Blast of War 1939-1945 (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1967), pi 5057
oQ

Iatrides, Revolt in Athens, p. 176, fn. 68, gives
the forces as of December 3 * Greek 13,000; British 13,000;
ELAS 50,000. ELAS reported its forces were 70,000, EAM White
Book, p. 55;
this figure is supported by Smith,
State of
Europe. p. 229.
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collaborators were allowed to fight with the Royal Hellenic
Army against the EAM.

40

The British originally planned to

utilize 10,000 men in Athens.

But it became necessary

to

bring additional troops from the Italian front until by the
end of December the

British forces had grown to 60,000 men

with another 18,000 on standby .^

Yet, at the War's end the

EAM remained in control of the majority of the Greek mainland
and Greek Isl and s.^
During the war, private American citizens, labor groups ,
and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People joined in writing and wiring Roosevelt expressing dis
may that accepted principles for the postwar world could so
easily be crushed. These messages contained a recurring theme,
that of support for a future United Nations.

The International

Woodworkers of America wired Roosevelt*
It is evident that Great Britain has erred from the
path charted in the Atlantic Charter, which in article
No. 3 states; "They respect the right of all people to
choose the form of government under which they will live;
and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government
restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of
them." . . . We urge that immediate action be taken to
alleviate the critical situation that is now in Greece
before reactionary elements in this country and Britain

^ S m i t h , State of Europe, p. 233; see also O'Ballance,
Greek Civil W a r , pp. 93-94.
^Woodward, British Foreign Policy, pp. 421-23; see
also Feis, Churchill Roosevelt Stalin, p. 541, fn. 58.
/o
Smith, State of Europe, p. 231.
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use it for the purpose of dividing the United Nations. 43
Americans protested British treatment of the EAM as
well.

Telegrams, and letters referred tix the resistance group

as war heroes and questioned the failure of the American gov
ernment in coming to the aid of the former resistance f ighters,
A California chapter of the NAACP reminded the President that
the war was against fascism, not an allied people:
It is a well established fact the ELAS in Greece rep
resents, the coalition of democratic forces which drove
the Nazis out of Greece.
All freedom loving people de
plore the unfortunate policy of the British government
in Greece. . . . We protest the use of American made
instruments of war against the Greek people.
We urge
President Roosevelt to use the influence of the United
States to put an end to the unnecessary conflict in
Greece. . . .
44
In answer to those requesting Roosevelt's support in
ending the Greek Civil War was a stated policy of United States
neutrality.

Secretary of State E. R. Stettinius declared on

December 5 that the United States policy was non-interference
in the internal affairs of liberated countries.

He ad ded :

"The American people have naturally viewed with sympathy the
aspirations of the resistance movements and the anti-Fascist
elements in liberated countries."

45

This statement was re-

/Q
Memorandum to StettinLus, OF 206-A, December 14,
1944;
attached telegram from International Woodworkers of
America, Everett, Washington; memorandum to The State Depart
ment, Blake to Hughes, OF 206-A, December 13, 1944.
^ Q u o t e d Fr-om memorandum to Daniels, OF 93, January
10, 1945, with attached telegram from California NAACP.
45Quoted from FRUS (1944), V, 148
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leased to the
Europe.

46

broadcast throughout

This announcement invoked a heated response from

Churchill,
tions.

Voice of America to be

and resulted in the first split in Allied rela-

In a conciliatory letter to Prime Minister Churchill

on December 13,1944, Roosevelt recommended that a regency be
created until such time as a plebiscite could be held and he
suggested demobilizing the
resistance forces.

48

Mountain Brigade as well as the

Despite the practicality of the Presi

dent's advice, many would die before Churchill heeded it.
Both Br itish and American news commentators were pres
ent in Athens during the period. Their reports affected pub
lic opinion in both countries. Edward P. Morgan reported from
London that both

The Times and Manchester Guardian opposed

Churchill's policies. A summary of British press opinion car
ried in the Chicago Daily News December 7,

was unanimously

critical. The Times said the government had created a "disas
trous predicament"
Europe.

that would draw

criticism from across

The Manchester Guardian called for an end to inter

ference in the

affairs of liberated countries.

The Daily

Herald asked that the Greek people be allowed to choose their
own government. The News Chronicle called for an end to sup-

46FRUS (1944), V, 148.
/

~7

Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 836-37.
48

Roosevelt to Churchill as quoted
Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 299-301.

in Churchill,
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porting a monarch

49

with arm s .

George Weller represented

the Chicago Daily News in Athens and his articles accused the
British of doing more damage to the city than the Germans did
during their occupation.

He charged the

British and the

British-supported Greek government were making war, with American made lend-lease weapons, on women and children.
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One

of Weller's reports concerned United Nations Relief and Reha
bilitation Administration packages which were 70 percent Amer
ican supplied.

Weller charged that General Scobie would not

allow food distribution to a starving population.

The sup

plies were stacked in Piraeus's warehouses to be sold by the
Greek right on the black market.

51

Richard Mowrer's reports

were also carried in the Chicago Daily News.

He accused the

British of fighting alongside former Nazi collaborators and
52
Metaxas regime fascists to defeat the Greek people.
A Stars
and Stripes editorial claimed Britain showed more preoccupa
tion with insuring
mans.

53

a route to India than defeating the Ger-

One reference to a report

supporting Churchill's

^ C h i c a g o Daily News. December 7, 1944, p. 2; Dec
ember 14, 1944, p. 2 j December 22, 1944, p. 6.
~^Ibid.. December 15, 1944, p. 2; December 30, 1944,
p. 1; December 22, 1944, p. 4.
~^Ibid..
1944, p . 5.

December 23, 1944, p. 1, 2;

~^Ibid.. December 21, 1944, p. 3.
~^Ibid., December 19, 1944, p. 2.

December 26,
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policies was found in the conservative Chicago Daily News from
October 1944

through the spring of 1945.

Emphasizing her

objections to British policies, Dorothy Thompson noted in her
column on December 11 that Herman Goebbels, in a German radio
broadcast, had supported the British effort. Goebbels called
for joint British-German action to defeat European Communism.
Greek-American Societies

registered protest to the

reported events. The largest and most influential, the Amer
ican Hellenic Educational Progressive Association

(AHEPA),

with an estimated membership of fifty thousand issued a press
statement on December 5 calling British intervention,
application of imperialistic and power politics."

"the

This an

nouncement continued: "Only an aroused American public opinion
can force

Colonel Blimps and

other imperialists of Great

Britain to discontinue . . . this blatant rape of Greece."

55

In the midst of a deteriorating military situation,
Churchill and Anthony Eden

visited Athens on December 15,

1944. At last the British Prime Minister agreed to the estab
lishment of a regency under the leadership of the Archbishop
of Athens,

Damaskinos, and returned to

London to convince

George II to agree to this arrangement. This regency provided

•^Chicago Daily News. December 11, 1944, p. 6.
55

Press release, statement of George C. Vournas, OF
206-A, December 5, 1944.
For information on Greek American
Societies see Saloutos,
"The Greeks in the United States,"
pp. 79-80. Saloutos estimated that there were 500,000 Greeks
in the United States in 1945, see Ibid., p. 69.
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the foundation for political
uneasy peace

arbitration which produced an

agreed to at Varkiza, Greece,

on February 3,

1945.56
George C. Vournas, Supreme President of A H EP A, wrote
concerning Churchill's Athens visit*

"I assume that you, too,

have read in the papers that the mighty Churchill and the sly
Eden are in Athens in order to assist the Greeks to compose
their differences."

57

Mr. Vournas also asked that President

Roosevelt make a public statement on events in Greece "so that
he may preserve

his moral influence

on a global basis."

58

William D. Hassett,

Secretary to the President, replied by

wire for Roosevelt:

"It will not be possible for him to make

a formal statement at this time."

59

On December 16, Harry Hopkins, Special Assistant to
President Roosevelt,

cabeled Churchill in reference to the

hostility of American public opinion toward British actions
fsf)
in Greece.
This hostility and disillusionment was reflected
in a public opinion poll dated December 30, 1944.

This poll

Woodward, British Foreign Policy, pp. 424-35.
57

Quoted from letter, George C. Vournas to Roosevelt,
PPF 1242, December 27, 1944.
58ibid .
59

Quoted from telegram, WilliamD. Hassett to Vournas,
PPF 1242, January 8, 1945.
f\0
Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p . 842.
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found Britain the culprit in disrupting Big Three relations:
Of those 'dissatisfied* with Big Three Cooperation (about
one-third of the public), 54% now blame England as com
pared with 33% in April.
On the other hand,
18% now
blame Russia as compared with 44% in April.
61
Churchill's Athens visit was
public attitude,

reported to have improved the

"but suspicion remains that Churchill seeks

to dominate the Greek government against the will of the Greek
62
people."
Of those polled 56 percent stated liberated coun
tries should be allowed to create their own governments, with
no intervention from Britain,

Russia, or the United States,

even if civil strife were the result.
Retained White House mail was divided into categories
representing two month periods

and in turn separated as to

those expressing political or non-political opinions.

Table

I illustrates that the mail for December and January was over
whelmingly

political

and expressed opposition

to British

intervention. Correspondence was again evaluated as to whether
it represented; an ethnic group; influential or non-influential
individuals; labor groups; or other organizations.

64

Quoted from memorandum for President, PSF Stettinius,
December 30, 1944; "Public Opinion," December 1944.
62Ibid.
63Ibid.
64

Evaluated correspondence is located m the following
Official Files or Personal Presidential File s» OF 206-A, OF
48, OF 93, OF 4847, OF 48-A, PPF 50-M, PPF.772, PPF 1242.
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TABLE I

OPINION AND SOURCES OF WHITE HOUSE MAIL
CONCERNING GREECE: OCTOBER 1944 - MARCH 194 5
1 944
Oct/Nov

1944-45
Dec/Jan

1945
Feb/Mar

OPINIONS
Non-political
Liberation of
Greece

0

10(83.3%)

Political:
opposed to
British presence
in Greece
2(16.7%)
Requests for U.S.
action in Greece
that omit refer
ence to Britain

0

1(33.3%)

14(87.5%)

1(33.3%)

2(12.5%)

1(33.3%)

SOURCES
Ethnic Origin

7(58.3%)

4(25%)

1(33.3%)

Non-influential
individuals
1(8.3%)

5(31.3%)

0

Influential
individuals

2(12.5%)

2(66.7%)

0

3(18.8%)

0

Other Groups (NonEthnic, Non-Labor
0

2(12.5%)

0

Labor Groups

4(33.3%)

Total Retained
Correspondence* 12(38.7%)

16(51.6%)

3(9.7%)

"'These totals represent an unknown number of individ
uals, as petitions and memoranda which refer to several or
hundreds of individuals were evaluated as one.
Also, it is
not known how many individuals are represented by organiza
tional mail.
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Correspondence for December and January was much
higher in its condemnation of Britain than the December 30
poll previously mentioned.

Almost 88 percent of this corre

spondence opposed British action in Greece.

An additional

12.5 percent was political in nature but made no mention of
Britain, while requesting United States aid in solving the
Greek dilemma.

This correspondence came from more diversified

sources than either of the two other periods.

It also had the

highest incidence of mail expressing political views.

Mot

one retained message supported British policy in Greece.
Public opinion as reported in a poll of January 6,
1945 indicated approval of a United States policy of non
interference in the internal affairs of liberated countries.
This poll indicated a majority disapproved of unilateral action
on the part of Britain and the Soviet Union, but also illus
trated a surprising degree of public apathy on foreign policy
as only 43 percent had heard of the Dumbarton Oaks Confer
ence.^

While the Dumbarton Oaks Conference had no direct

bearing on correspondence concerning Greece,

lack of knowledge

concerning its proposals- would indicate the small number of
Americans interested in foreign policy.

Correspondence of a

political nature could be expected to come from this group.
Two polls dated January 16, 1945 concur with those of
December 30, 1944, and January 6, 1945, in condemning British

^Stettinius to Roosevelt, PSF State Department,
January 6, .1945; "Public Opinion," January 194 5.
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policy in Greece.

These polls also express the fear that a

successful United Nations
face of the

would be an impossibility in the

unilateral actions on the

part of Britain and

Russia.^
On January 16,

57 percent of those

polled desired

active interest on the part of the United States in the af
fairs of liberated countries.

The impetus to this interest

were the activities of Great Britain and Russia. ^
correspondence is much higher
active American interest.

Political

in the percentage requesting

Where correspondence

condemned

British policies in Greece, it also called for some positive
American action.

The request for positive action took two

fo rms : a declaration on the part of President Roosevelt con
demning British interference;or the presence of American mil
itary to act in a police ca p a c i t y . ^
The volume of White House mail concerning Greece is
insignificant during February and March 1945.

The Varkiza

Agreement of February 3, 1945 ended open hostilities in Greece,
and that country was no longer one of the main concerns of the
American press. A State Department poll on February 23, 1945

Two memos for President, PSF State Department, Jan
uary 16, 1945}
"British Interference in Regard Greece and
Italy;" "Russian Interference in Poland."
67Ibid.
^^Supra. fn. 64.
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reflected a similar conclusion:
'Dissatisfaction' with Allied cooperation dropped
from 43% to 25%, press and radio criticism of both Brit
ain and Russia having sharply declined since the slack
ening of attention to the Greek crisis and the focus of
headlines on the Russian offensive.
69
However, a majority of the

discontented group continued to

blame Britain, not the Soviet Union, for disrupting the Allied
cause. The poll continued: "An overwhelming majority of Amer
icans feel that the United States should have 'as much to say '
as our British and Russian Allies in the settlement of various
European problems growing out of the war.

70
"

On the basis of those represented in the four polls
cited, American opinion

shifted from non-interference to a

belief if Britain and the Soviet Union could intervene, the
United States should.
dence as early as

This view is reflected in correspon

October and November of 1944.

indicate where concerned

It would

Americans found a nation's policy

distasteful they expected their government to take some action,
even if that action were unilateral.
Table II illustrates conclusions drawn from correspondence of October 1944 to March 1945.

1945;

71

These percentages are

69Grew to Roosevelt, PSF State Department, February 24,
"Public Opinion," February 1945.

70ibid.
71

These percentages will be different from those pre
viously cited as they are based on a six-month total, while
previous percentages are figured on a two-month period.
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based on a total for the entire six month period. The volume
of retained

White House mail relating to

Greece increased

from less then 39 percent in October and November to over 51
percent in December and January. It then dropped dramatically
in February and March. The October to January totals reflected
the crisis period of liberation followed by the Greek Civil
War.

From October to November mail concerned the liberation

of Greece and a majority was Greek American in origin.

The

overwhelming majority of all political mail received was in
the period of the active Greek Civil War,
January.

As has been stated, it was

and unanimous

from December to

diversified in origin,

in its condemnation of British interference.

In February and March,

the cessation of active hostilities

and constant press coverage concerning Greece, is reflected
in the decline of correspondence.
In summary, White House mail reflects the opinion of
interested or informed individuals and organizations, and it is
sufficiently diversified when established principles are in
volved, in this case those of the Atlantic Charter. The mail
for this period, October 1944 to March 1945, overwhelmingly
condemned the initial

British policy of unilateral action,

and resented infringement of the

accepted principle of re

specting the rights of individual countries.
sulted reached
majority.

the same conclusion,

The polls con

but not by as great a

Both polls and correspondence indicated a growing

belief the United States should take positive action in lib-
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TABLE II

INCREASE AND DECREASE OF WHITE HOUSE MAIL
CONCERNING GREECE

October 1944 to March 1945
Oct/Nov 44

Dec 44/Jan 45

Feb/Mar 45

100%

75%

51.6%
50%
45.6

25%
12.80%

0%

Legend«

Percent of retained mail in a six month
period in time period indicated.
Letters of a political nature by time
period indicated.
Percent of letters from Greek American
Societies by time period indicated.
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erated countries. The initial post World War II public impetus
torward United States

intervention in the

affairs of other

nations was the unilateral action of Great Britain in Greece.

TERRITORY CLAIMED BY THE GREEK GOVERNMENT INCLUDED
.
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CHAPTER III

THE "MEGALI IDEA" AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
1945-1947

The student of history can very easily project what
is presently significant upon the value systems of the past.
In the years 1945 to 1947, within Greece , there was continuing
demand for a

liberalized social system.

This effort was

thwarted by conservative Greek politicans with the aid of a
sympathetic Britain.

Those who wished to retain traditional

practices and perogatives caused constant conflict within a
country whose economy and people were devastated by World War
11.^

Yet internal political strife and economic hardship is

not the theme of the major portion of correspondence to Pres
ident Truman during this period.

Messages concerning Greece

ref lect territorial demands of the Greek government, conf irming
the conclusion of Gabriel A. Almond regarding ethnic groups:
The influence of foreign ethnic and linguistic
groups on American foreign policy generally takes the
form of efforts to enlist American support for policies
affecting their homelands.
Historically such influence
was mainly directed toward traditional national aims such
as the preservation or return of national territory.
2

^For an account of the devastation imposed on the
Greek economy and population by the Germans, see George Exintaris, "The Position in Greece," International Affairs. Vol.
20 (April 1944), pp. 204-11.
2

Almond, American People, p. 183.

47,
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Within the two

year period following

the death of

Franklin Roosevelt, and President Truman*s announcement of the
"Truman Doctrine" on March 12,1947, almost 85 percent of the
total retained correspondence concerning Greece was political
in nature.

3

Of this political mail, over 72 percent supported

Greek territorial and reparation

claims and less than 28 per

cent concerned the political conflict in Greece. The minority
of the political messages dealt with the continued presence
of British forces, abuses by the right wing government, and
the Greek elections in March and September of 1946.
The Greek government had as its primary foreign policy
territorial

claims and reparation

toward this end was begun by

for war damages.

Work

the government while still in

exile, and intensified between 1945 and 1947.

In addition,

financial assistance in the form of loans and grants was con
tinually requested from both Britain and the United States.
The primary use of loans was to be for maintaining a military
force, not reconstruction.^
Territorial

aggrandizement in Greek

is called the

—

This correspondence is retained OF 206-M, Box 778,
"Truman Doctrine"
(Harry S. Truman Library,
Independence,
Missouri).
All unpublished manuscripts in this chapter are
from this source, unless otherwise designated, and hereinaf ter
will be cited by description, file number, and date only.
^Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers. pp. xiii, 96,
99, 228, 256 s see also United States Department of State,
Foreign Relations, of the United States
(1945), Vol. VIII,
"The Near E a s t a n d Africa," Pubn^ 8427 (1969), pp. 193-300;
(Hereinafter cited as FRUS (1945), VIII).

49

"Megali Idea" or the "Great Idea." The "Megali Idea" has been

-*be f*4z.

of paramount importance in Greek politics since 1864.

Its

emotional appeal has succeeded in subjugating any political
issue throughout

this century.

This dream of a

"Greater

Greece" incorporated all territories once part of Byzantium,
and includes all areas where

Greek-speaking peoples form a

majority of the population.

Greek-Americans retained this

desire and successf ully supported it among non-Greek-Americans.
The "Megali Idea" has captured the Greek imagination to the
extent that no national issue seems to have equaled or sub
merged its attraction."*
Within Greece, the "Megali Idea"
wing politicians during 1945 and 1946
interests.

was used by right

to further their own

Greek territorial claims successfully submerged

domestic economic and social problems.

The Populists, who

favored the return of the King, maintained they must be elected
or the United States and Great Britain would not support Greek
territorial claims. These claims, many dating from 1912, cen
tered on territories along the northern Greek borders* North
Epirus or Southern Albania; an extension of the Greek border
into Bulgaria; and Macedonia which included territory claimed
by Yugoslavia.

In addition, the Dodecanese Islands, which

were Italian controlled,
claimed.

and located in the Aegean,

were

Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia, of course, did

^Forster, Short History, pp. 20, 32; see also Saloutos,
"The Greeks in the United States," p. 73.

50

not accept the righteousness of the Greek cause,

and Greek

territorial claims caused constant f riction with these Balkan
countries.

In addition,

leftist groups within Greece found

sanctuary in Yugoslavia and Albania, thus adding to political
friction.

The Greek government used fears of foreign inter

vention from its northern neighbors
claims to distract
gordian knot,

as well as territorial

the Greek people.

The issue created a

as Greece aggravated its Balkan neighbors by

claiming their territory, and these countries in return of
fered sanctuary to political

elements in opposition to the

Greek government and claimed Greece- instigated border inci
dents to get British and United States support.

The Greek

left became associated by some Americans and Greeks with the
international designs

of the Soviet Union.

As the Soviet

Union supported Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia rather than
Greece, both the Greek leftist movement, and the Soviet Union
suffered in popularity.

In addition,

the implications of

Greek territorial claims were to broaden the growing conflict
between the United States,

Britain and the Soviet Union in

1945 and 1946. The Soviet Union supported the Balkan govern
ments as opposed to Britain and the United States which aided
Greece.
z
Stavrianos, Greece; American Dilemma, p. 170; Wi l
liam Hardy McNeill, The Greek Dilemma; War and Aftermath (New
York; J, B. Lippincott Co., 1947), pp. 244-52; (Hereinafter
cited as McNeill, Greek Dilemma); Xydis, Greece and The Great
Powers. pp. 15-16, 100-101, 294-95; see also Kousoulas, Rev
olution and Defeat, forward by C. M. Woodhouse, p. vi.
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Greek territorial demands had tremendous appeal and
support in the United States.

Greek-American societies, as

well as a non-ethnic society, the "Justice for Greece Commit
tee," were active in petitioning the United States government
to further Greek claims. The Justice for Greece Committee was
organized in the United States in October, 1945.

Initially

it was sponsored by ‘Greek American societies, such as AHEPA
and the Panepirotic Society, but many non-Greeks became mem
bers and served on the advisory board. Among its influential
leaders were Mrs. Calvin Coolidge, Honorary Chairman; Sumner
Welles, Chairman, Advisory Board; Edwin L. James of the New
York Times; James Truslow Adams, American historian; and U. S.
Senators Robert Taft and Arthur Vandenberg.

Eventually more

than 33 percent of the United States Senate belonged to this
organization.

Because of this committee's work, the Senate

passed Resolution 82 in the spring of 1946.

Initially spon

sored by Senator Claude D. Pepper of Florida, this resolution
was in support of Greek territorial claims.

Literature from

the Justice for Greece Committee stressed the strategic impor
tance of Greece, and declared that its political difficulties
were the result of the
democratic beliefs.

confrontation between

communist and

This literature also emphasized Greek

ties to Western democratic nations, as Greece had given birth
7
to democracy.
~
^Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers. Annex VI, "The
Justice for Greece Committee," pp. "7lT-T3T~~
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In voicing the demands of the Greek government,

the

Justice for Greece Committee and the Greek- American societies
were f urthering the aims of right wing elements within Greece.
The leftist EAM and KKE

publically acceded to

the popular

appeal of the "Megali Idea," but originally stressed recon
structing Greek political and economic conditions, not ter
ritorial claims. Had the left obtained power, it is unlikely
they would have
Balkans.

pushed these claims,

certainly not in the

The left, however, publicly included British con

trolled Cyprus within its territorial demands.

This was a

rather pointed reminder that the right had dropped the issue
g
of Cyprus since acquiring British military support.
A Democratic National Committee memorandum of October
17, 1944 refers to the majority of the Greek-American community as "liberal."

9

Within a two year period the

"Megali

Idea" successfully attracted Greek-American sympathies to the
aspirations of a right wing Greek government,

and signifi

cantly attracted United States government leaders to sympa
thize with the Greek cause. This "cause" increasingly aggra
vated tensions between the British, the United States and the
Soviet Union as the small nations involved elicited support

o
Eudes , Kapetanios t pp. 245-46;
Dilemma. p. 256.

McNeill, The Greek

^Memorandum, Charles Olson to James Barnes, OF 772,
October 17, 1944 (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park,
New York).
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from these more powerful countr ies .^ In addition the Justice
for Greece Committee distributed literature among U. S. gov
ernment officials. Of the correspondence to President Truman
in 1946, over 59 percent represented influential individual
sources,

(e.g.- newspaper editors, church leaders, state'and

government officials). A majority of that correspondence was
from members of Congress.

Literature made available by the

Justice for Greece Committee, and distributed to congressmen
stressed that a conflict of "ideologies" centered in Greece,
and portrayed Greece as a bulwark of democracy in the Medi
terranean. As early as 1945, the Justice for Greece Committee
proclaimed the United States would inevitably have to inter
vene on the side of democracy.^ An example of the many mes
sages to President Truman from this organization,

stressing

Greece's strategic location and her significance as a constant
American ally stated*
Trieste, Dardanelles and Suez without Greece are use
less to the westerners . . . M r . President we appeal to
you to make your great influence felt on the subject.
Please use vision and fight to save the imperiled
little nation which is the best and most dependable
friend of America. Respectfully "The Justice for Gre
ece Committee," Mrs. Calvin Coilidge honorary Chair
man, Chauncy Hamlin Chairman, Sumner Welles. 12
James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York and Lon
don: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1947), pp. 73, 100-101,
115-17; ('Hereinafter cited as Byrnes, Speaking Frankly. )
^Xydis , Greece and The Great Powers, p. 711; see
correspondence concerning Greece, OF 206-M, Box 778.
12

Telegram, "The Justice For Greece Committee," to
Truman: for o t h e r .examples, see OF 206-M, Box 778, October 9,
1946.
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Both AHEPA and the Justice for Greece Committee were
active in supporting
Epirus,

all Greek territorial

the Dodecanese Islands,

claims on the Bulgarian frontier.

gains to North

and ratification of Greek
13

The Panepirotic Federa

tion of America, whose headquarters were in Worcester, Massa
chusetts,

was devoted exclusively to Greek

North Epirus.

acquisition of

This society wrote many letters to President

Truman throughout 1945 and 1946.

Letters concerning North

Epirus were submitted to delegates to the San Francisco Con
ference,

and to President Truman,

Prime Minister Winston

Churchill and Marshall Joseph Stalin at Potsdam in 1945.

North

Epirus was represented as historically belonging to Greece,
with a majority population of Greek-speaking peoples.

As to

its present condition as part of Albania, the Potsdam letter
stated a recurring theme:
It has been forced to become a part of Albania,
under
whose yoke it has suffered grievously, and now is faced
with the extermination of its martyred inhabitants by
Enver Hoxha's orders, whose manifest purpose is to change
the Greek character of this region through persecution
and expulsion.
14
Greece claimed atrocities were constantly committed against
the Greek population of Albania,

and also opposed Albanian

13

Telegram,
"The Justice For Greece Committee," to
Truman, March 9, 1946, April 22, 1946; letter, AHEPA to Tru
man, June 12, 1946, July 16, 1946.
^Letter, the National Committee of the Panepirotic
Federation of American, Inc. , to Truman, Churchill and Stalin,
OF 206-M, Box 778, August 1945.
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membership in the United Nations. The United States supported
this opposition and the issue of North Epirus caused constant
conflict at the Paris Peace Conference, from July to October
1946. Both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union supported Albania,
in opposition to Greece and her patrons, Britain and the United
States.^

Simultaneous with these disagreements, Yugoslavia

accused the United States of violating Yugoslavian air space.
In August 1945, two American transports were forced down by
the Yugoslavian Air Force.

As an unprovoked incident, this

caused widespread resentment

and tension within the United

1 /r

States.

These actions

of Yugoslavia, should be viewed in

a wider context of Balkan border disputes and the resulting
big nation alignment on the side of the participants.
Records of the United States Department of State do
not reveal sentimental

attachment to Greek claims.

These

records reveal a clear knowledge of events within Greece, and
a realistic assessment of the Greek government and its claims .^
Greece did not receive North Epirus, or an extension
of the Greek northern border into Bulgaria. The issue served

Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, pp. 271, 277,
293-95; Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 142.
^Byrnes,

Speaking Frankly, pp. 144-46.

^ FRUS (1945), V I I I , 300-58; United States Department
of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (1946), Vol.
VII, "The Near East and Africa," Pubn. 8490 (1969). pp. 135-36,
139-43, 145-47; (Hereinafter cited as FRUS (1946), VII).

5.6

no purpose but that of creating friction within the Balkans
1o
and between Anglo-American and Soviet interests.
Greece
was awarded the Dodecanese Islands. These Aegean Islands were
recognized as an important access to the Dardanelles and Black
Sea by the United States Department of State, which originally
requested, on April 17, 1945, that they be put under British
military control.

The Dodecanese were awarded to Greece by

the Council of Foreign Ministers in June 1946.

19

Greek con

trol of the Dodecanese would further intensify that country0s
strategic interest to the United States.

20

During 1945 and 1946, almost 28 percent of White House
mail which was political in nature,
situation in Greece,
claims.

reflected the internal

rather then territorial or reparation

This correspondence mirrored a worsening political

situation that would make free Greek elections difficult, and
an increasing resentment over the continued presence of British
forces.

A series of right wing governments entrenched con

servative power within the Greek military, the gendarmerie,

^Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, pp. 205, 31835? McNeill, Greek Dilemma^ pp. 259-60.
19FRUS (1945), VIII, 307-8,
U. S, Ambassador Lincoln
MacVeagh reported on the return of the Dodecanese : "Contrasting
with officialdom and the party press,
general public has
shown little enthusiasm. . . .''See also FRUS (1946), VII, 173.

20For Greece's

strategic significance, see George
Fielding Eliot, "Why.We Have Military Missions in 17 Nations,"
Readers Digest, Vol. 53 (October 1948), pp. 132-35.
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local police, and the government bureaucracy. The British did
not allow open press censorship, but the Greek government re
stricted the paper allotment to the leftist press, and raised
rates on left wing periodicals to curtail their activities.
British military authorities would not

allow officers with

royalist sympathies to be removed from the Greek armed forces.
These monarchist off icers controlled the Royal Hellenic troops .
Members of the anti-monarchist Liberal party and of the left
ist parties were forced to forego military careers, or join
the increasing bands of guerrilla forces.

Both university

professors and civil servants were replaced if their records
indicated liberal or leftist sympathies.

These right wing

activities were in clear violation of the Varkiza Agreement
made on February 12, 1945 which guaranteed no reprisals against
EAM members or any liberal group, and promised the creation
of a Greek government incorporating
Greek Archbishop Damaskinos
January 1945 to September 1946.

both left and right.

21

served as Regent from

The Greek premiers during

1945 were liberal General Nicholas Plastiras, who was forced

2TNews release by

Greek American Committee for Na
tional Unity. OF 206-A, March 2 9, 1945 (Roosevelt Library);
see the following from OF 206-M,
Box 778 (Truman Library)j
letter, Harry Anton, President, Hellenic-American Fraternal
Society. Detroit, Michigan, to Edward Stettinius (copy to Sen
ator Vandenberg), May 17, 1945; cablegram, Demetris Partsalides,
EAM, to Truman, June 18, 1945;
petition requesting
Greek government representative of right and left to United
States, Soviet Union and British supervision of Greek elec
tions, August 1945;
letter, Spyros P. Skouras to Truman,
September 4, 1945; letter, George P. Skouras to Judge Samuel
Rosenman, November 20, 1945.
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to resign by royalists, and replaced by the ultra-monarchist
Admiral Petros

Voulgaris

October as his government
and repression of all

in April; Volgaris resigned in
was accused of' right wing terror

Greek liberal elements.

Archbishop

Damaskinos served as Premier and Regent until a short-lived
government was created under Premier Panayiotis Kanellopoulos
the last of October; finally a British-instigated government
was formed under aging Liberal, Themistoclis Sofoulis in Nov22
ember.
On March 31, 1946 the first postwar Greek election
returned a Populist majority thus creating a royalist govern
ment.

Constantine Tsaldaris became Prime Minister, and on

September 1, 1946 a plebiscite returned George II to the Greek
23
throne.
As Premier followed Premier and King followed

22FRUS (1945), VIII, 122-25, 169, 182-84.
Information sent to the White House by George P. Skouras, included
Constantine Poulas, "Greek Tragedy, 1945," The Nation (Nov
ember 3, 1945) OF 206-M, Box 778, November 20, 1945? see also
address by Andre Michalopoulos to The Forum of' the Cooperative
Committee. Washington, D. C., March 19,1947, concerning con
ditions within Greece, 1945-1946 in OF 206-M, Box 778.
23

. .
Cablegram, John Sophianopoulos, Elo Svolos, Hadjibeis
Agrarian Gavrilides, Kyrkos, Kritikas to Truman,
OF 206-M,
Box 778, April 8 , 1946. Other accounts that question the hon
esty of the March 31, 1946, election and September 1, 1946,
plebiscite a r e * George de Santillana, "The Greek Elections,"
The New Republic. V o l . 114 (April 8 , 1946), pp. 496-97; Basil
Vlavianos,
"Greece and Its Allies,"
The Nation. Vol. 163
(September 28, 1946), pp. 344-46.
Basil Vlavianos was the
liberal publisher and editor of the National Herald a New
York Greek language newspaper.
His correspondence to Presi
dent Roosevelt has been quoted, see supra. Chapter II; "Greece
Ballots in Chaos," Newsweek. Vol. 27 (April 1, 1946), pp. 4546; "Greece* Battle Royal," Newsweek. Vol. 17 (April 22,1946),
pp. 46-47; Smith, State of Europe, pp. 234-35..
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Regent, there was little significant improvement in the con
dition of the Greek people, or the inflation ridden Greek econ
omy.

The Greek government devoted itself to territorial and

reparation claims, and increasing the military.

No adequate

program or budget for reconstruction was attempted, as a result
the Greek population suffered a lack of food,

shelter, and

jobs. Relief supplies provided by UNRRA and such agencies as
American Relief for Greek Democracy were poorly distributed,
24
and m many cases were the <subject of profiteering.
Mean
while, the Greek countryside was torn with civil strife, as
right battled left across the provinces of Greece. Two years
of rightist suppression forced liberal and leftist Greeks to
join the outlawed guerrilla forces and Greece was to experi25
ence continual civil war until the fall of 1949.
'j

Letter, Robert St. John to Truman,
OF 206-M, Box
778, December 18, 1946; see also Ernest 0 . Hauser, "Europe's
Most Frightened Country." Saturday Evening Post. Vol. 218,
(December Z9, 1945), pp. 9-11, 44, 47;
Hal Lehrman "Athens
Calling," The Nation. Vol. 160 (May 5, 1945), pp. 515-17;
"The Shape of Things," The Nation, Vol. 163
(December 28,
1946), p. 741.
25

Heinz Eulau,
"Counter-Revolution in Greece," The
New Republic. Vol. 113 (July 30, 1945), pp. 121-22; "Bad Faith
in Greece," The New Republic. Vol. 112 (May 28, 1945), p. 727;
L. S.
Stavrianos, "Vacuum in Greece." The New Republic. Vol.
113 (December 24 1945) , pp. 863-65 ; Major J. A. Whitely, "Our
selves and Greece*," The Nineteenth Century. Vol. 139 (March
1946), pp. 101-105.
Civil War ended in Greece in the summer
of 1949. The Greek National Army was directed and supplied by
the United States.
Napalm was first used at this time, see
O'Ballance, Greek Civil W a r , pp. 198-99. For a Greek^ author,'s
fictionalized,
but true picture of Greek civil strife, see
Nikcs* Kazantzakis , The 7Fratricides , trans . by Athena Gianakas
Dallas (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964).
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The Greek American Council in New York City was the
most active American based agency supporting the Greek left
and liberal forces.
British intervention

This group published the EAM acoount of
and subsequent Civil War.

Entitled,

National Liberation Front E.A.M. White Book, and first pub
lished in Trikkala, Greece in February 1945,

this text was
76
sent to President Truman by George P. Skouras.
In November
1945, the Greek American Council released copies of a British
document dated August 12, 1943 to the American press.

This

document, a confidential report to British Middle East Head
quarters,

was the report of a British agent's

work within

Greece to undermine EAM, and turn its members over to German
forces. The report also contained evidence of active British
support for conservative resistance organizations such as EKKA
27
which had pronounced royalist sympathies.
Throughout 1945
and 1946, the Greek American Council wrote President Truman
protesting conditions within Greece,

and requesting United

States action that would end royalist suppression, and create
a coalition government incorporating both left and right.
In September of 1945, the United States announced its
intention of participating in an

Allied mission to oversee

76

EAM White Book forwarded to White House by George
Skouras, OF 206-M, Box 778, October 26, 1945.
^ New York Post, November 9, 1945, p. 2; OF 206-M,
Box 778, TfTis account is supported by research for this study
supra. Chapter II.
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Greek elections.

This election mission was originally pro

posed at Potsdam and was to include representatives from the
United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.

The

Soviet Union declined on the grounds such a mission consti
tuted interference in the internal affairs of Greece. Composed
of British, French, and American members, the mission arrived
in Athens, in December

1945.

Few of the American group,

which was mainly composed of military officers under the lead2g
ership of Henry F. Grady, spoke Greek.
Both liberal and
leftist groups within Greece feared early elections.
felt royalist control of the local

It was

and national government

agencies, plus the activities of the royalist bands of X-ites
29
would make any attempt at open elections meaningless.
The Greek American Council petitioned President Truman
to delay elections until conditions could be improved:
Honest elections March 31 in Greece
impossible under
present conditions of fraud and violence imprisonment
of anti-fascist and determination all democratic parties
to abstain from fake elections.
Greek democratic press
and even Greek cabinet members have declared honest
elections impossible March 31 and calls for postpone
ment. < . . .
Yet Great Britain intervenes to insist
elections be held. We urge American government and State
Department sharply disassociate United States from this
intervention on side Greek reactionary. . . .
30
^ FRUS (1945), VIII, 98-147.
29

Report of The Allied Mission to Observe Greek Elec
tions , 19461 OF 206-F. Box 719 , pp"! 22-23.
30

Telegram, Greek American Council to Truman, OF 206-M,
Box 778, March 4, 1946.
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The Greek American Council, which also was known as
the American Council For a Democratic Greece, was later placed
on the Attorney General's list of subversive societies.

31

Yet

the correspondence from this society reflected the views of re
spected American correspondents who witnessed events within
Greece.

George Weller of The Chicago Daily N e w s ? Leland Stowe,

New York Post Syndicate; and Howard K. Smith all reported
their findings in the American press.

In addition, the works

of American historian, L. S. Stavrianos,

supported the con-

elusions of the Greek American Council on these conditions.

32

George P. Skouras, New York City, was the most vocal
of the individual correspondents in opposition to British
intervention, the Greek right wing government, and the deci
sion of holding elections in March.

Skouras and his brother,

Spyros P. Skouras, national President of the Greek War Relief
Association,
to Truman.

33

Inc., visited Greece and reported on their findings
George Skouras was in Athens in November and

^ X y d i s , Greece and The Great Powers, p. 713; "Armed
Forces Security Questionnaire:
Organizations Designated by the
Attorney General, Pursuant to Executive Order 10450," lists
the Council of Greek -Americans "as having signif icance in con^
nection with the National Security."
37
.
George Weller, "Rightest Rule Stays in Greece," Chi
cago Daily N e w s , April 9, 194 5, p. 2; Leland Stowe's reports
are included in Stowe, While Time Remains, pp. 242-70; Howard
K. Smith, The State of Europe and L. S. Stavrianos, Greek
Pi lemma.
33
Letter, Spyros P. Skouras to Truman, OF 206-M, Box
778, September 4, 194 5; letter, George P. Skouras to Judge
Rosenman, OF 206-M, Box 778, November 12, 1945.
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December 1944 and interviewed Greek leaders of the left and
right.

The report of this visit supports evidence that the

revolt resulted from British and Greek right wing intransi
gence.

Skouras witnessed the events of December 3, and re

ported the crowd was fired on by police with no provocation.
He found Greek politicians t
. . . too excited and inclined to find . . . , that
though the opposition pretended to be democratic and lib
erals, down in their hearts they were all 'Communists1
and they were taking their orders from Moscow and acting
in Greece in the same manner as everywhere else in Europe,
the whole idea being a general uprising of the 'Communists*
all over Europe in order to upset the Anglo-American
policy.
34
In March 1946, Mr. Skouras wrote President Truman, as
"the only hope of 7,000,000 people"

and requested that the

Greek elections set for March 31, be delayed.

35

His letter

included recommendations that the Greek army and police force
be broadened to include men of all political persuasions, and
a new Greek voter registration be made under the supervision
of an Allied mission composed of representatives from Britain,
the United States, and the Soviet Union.

Of considerable

value in understanding the f uture political climate in Greece
were Skouras's listed objections to why elections should be
postponed.

His (Objections emphasized the easy accessibility

O/
Letter and report, George P. Skouras., OF 206-M, Box
7 70, January 3, 1945.
35
Letter, George P. Skouras to Truman, OF 206-M, Box
778, March 22, 1946.
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of voter registration books, claiming American Embassy offi
cials had received authorizations to vote and further charged
Monarchist sympathizers were furnished registration certifi
cates that

represented dead and non-existent

Conditions were so unfavorable

individuals.

that even Premier Sophoulis

recommended elections be delayed.

But more important, the

British director of elections, Colonel C. M. Woodhouse,

"the

man above all others distrusted by Greeks who fought the resis
tance because of what they considered his Machiavellian role
in their Civil W a r ," had complete charge of the election misO£
sion, including the American delegation.
The Allied

mission reported that

in spite of voter

registration lists which were ten years old and some evidence
of intimidation,

the Greek elections

flected the wishes of

of March 31, 1946 re

a majority of the Greek people.

The

report recommended that a Greek census be taken, and new voter
registration lists be compiled before the plebiscite on the

Letter, George P. Skouras to Truman, OF 206-M, Box
778, March 22, 1946; Skouras*s report on Greek conditions is
supported by sources,
supra. fn. 23;
see also Stavrianos,
Greece: American Dilemma, pp. 174-75.
C. M. Woodhouse served
as Commander of the British Military operating with the Greek
resistance during World War II.
In 1946, he was SecretaryGeneral of the Allied Mission to observe elections.
He was
anti-EAM/ELAS.
For an account of his experiences and views,
see C. M. Woodhouse,
Apple of Discord; A Survey of Recent
Greek Politics in Their International Setting, forward by the
R t . Hon. Lord Altrincham (London: Hutchinson and C o ., L t d .,
1948); (Hereinafter cited as Woodhouse, Apple of Discord).

65

King's return.

37

A British Parliamentary

Delegation which

visited Greece in August 1946 also recommended an updating of
voter registration lists and new elections.

38

During the months of 1945 and 1946, United States and
Soviet relations steadily worsened. It is not the purpose of
this paper to examine the rights or wrongs of that conflict.
But, just as British policy found a friendly Greece impera
tive in 1944, the United States discovered a similar need by
1947.

The United States and the Soviet Union began to clash

over the Balkans at the Potsdam Conference.
and 1946,

the Soviet Union was determined

Anglo-Soviet agreement of October 1944.

Throughout 1945
to maintain the

The United States

was equally determined to support the principles of the Dec
laration on Liberated Europe made at the Yalta Conference in
February 1945. This Declaration, based on the Atlantic Char
ter, stated the principle of self-determination for liberated
natrons.

39

Truman felt this principle was infringed upon by

37

Report of The Allied Mission to Observe Greek Elec
tions. 1946, OF 206-F. Box 7 79, pp. 22, 26-27.
EAM boycotted
the election.
This practice is considered a valid form of
political expression within Greece. Liberal parties originally
threatened to boycott, but were persuaded to take part, f'bid..
pp. 25-26.
38
Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma, p. 181.
39
Feis, Churchill Roosevelt Stalin, pp. 562-63; see
also Robert Lee Wolff,
The Balkans in Our Time (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), p p . 264-67.
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the Soviet Union

in its relations with

smaller nations.

40

The Soviet Union countered charges against Soviet control in
the Balkans, by referring to undemocratic conditions within
Greece.

41

That there is validity in

these charges may be

found in the number of instances the British Labor government
sought a broadening of the

Greek government to include all

parties,

and the British government's attempts to curtail
42
right wing repression.
In its turn, the United States re
sponded to Greek requests for financial assistance by recom

mending more democratic institutions and a national program
of reconstruction.

Illustrative of American views on Greek

aid was a Treasury Depratment memorandum in October 1 946 which
asserted that*

"The Greeks must tackle

their own internal

problems seriously

before expecting substantial
43
assistance from the United States."

monetary

The Greek internal situation became incidental within
the larger context of United States interest in the Near East

^T ruman,

Harry -S. Truman, p. 343.

^ C h a r l e s E. Bohlen,
Witness To History* 1929-1969
(New York* W. W. Norton and Co. , Inc. , 1 9 7 3 p*. 234; (Hereinafter cited as Bohlen, Witness To History.’)
/9

Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, pp. 130, 137,
151, 211, 233, 247, 254, 276, 300.
^ W i l l i a m H. Taylor
to Treasury Secretary Snyderf
"Information on Greek Delegation," Snyder File, Box 19 (Octo
ber, 1946; see also Xydis. Greece and The Great Powers, pp.
146, 259, 263; FRUS (1945). VIII. 213-15. 237; FRUS (1946),
VII, 170, 187-88.

and Mediterranean. That interest

opposed

Soviet influence

in Iran, Turkey, and the Eastern Mediterranean.^
geographic location

and control of the

negated the importance of a "dirty gray"
that country.

45

Greece's

Dodecanese Islands
government within

In addition, Truman's advisors such as Averell

Harrimar* Ambassador, to the Soviet Union; George F. Kennan artd
Charles E. Bohlen of the Embassy in Moscow; Secretary of State
James F. Byrnes. Chief of Staff William D. Leahy; Secretary
of the

Navy James Forrestal;

and Presidential

aide Clark

Clifford came to feel threatened by the actions of the Soviet
Union.

They felt containment of that

country's influence

offered the only protection for the United States.
the efforts

of these men,

and the decisions of

46

Through

President

Truman, the United States adopted Britain's historic role in
the Mediterranean: contain Russia.
Secretary of State James F. Byrnes adheredpartisan foreign
^T r u m a n .

policy principle.

to a bi

Byrnes maintained the

Years of Trial, pp. 93 96-,98.

45

Jones. Fifteen W e ek s. Jones describes the Greek gov
ernment in 1947, as "undemocratic, corrupt, and reactionary."
He concludes that this type of government might be described
as "a rather dirty gray," ibid., pp. 184-85.
4-6
Kaiser, Cold Winter, pp. 126-27; Xydis, Greece and
The Great Powers. Annex V, "G. F. Kennan*s Dispatch of February 22, 1946," p p . 699-709; Bohlen, Witness To History, pp.
260-63; Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 282-97; Frank Gervasi,
"Watchdog in the White House," Colliers. Vol. 122 (October 9,
1948), pp. 18, 76-77; Millis, Forrestal Diaries, pp. 172-73;
Leigh White, "Truman's One-Man Brain Trust." Saturday Evening
Post. Vol. 220 (October 4, 1947), p. 113.
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righteousness of open diplomacy, but at the same time expected
acceptance of all State Department decisions.

47

Those knowl

edgeable of official policy were automatically to agree with
that policy's implementation.

On September 12, 194^ Secretary

of Commerce Henry A. Wallace,

publicly disagreed

with the

evolving United States policy toward the Soviet Union.

This

speech resulted in a furor in the American press, and in gov
ernment circles.
month.

48

Wallace was forced

to resign that same

Henry Wallace had his Greek counterpart, John Soph

ianopoulos.

Sophianopoulos had served in.the Greek Cabinet

as Foreign Minister and as Greece's delegate to the San Fran
cisco Conference.
of the

As Greece's delegate to the first meeting

Security Council of the United Nations, he

his government's

instructions to repudiate

refused

Soviet charges

against the presence of British troops in Greece. The Soviet
Union had charged the British troops ‘in Greece "were an instrument of political pressure,

.49

Sophianopoulos was recalled

by his government in January 1946. Historian.S. G. Xydis has
referred to

Sophianopoulos as

^By rne s,

"a small-state Wallace" who

Speaking Frankly, pp. 233-3 5.

^ Chicago Daily N e w s . September 13, 1946, p. 9; Sep
tember 14, 1946, p. 1, 6 ; September 20, 1946, p. 1: headline,
"Truman Fires Wallace;" see also John Morton Blum, e d ., The
Price of Vision: Diary of Henry A. Wallace. 1942-1946 (Bos
ton: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973), p p . 609-32.
^Woodhouse,

Apple of Discord, p. 260.
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desired Greece to serve as a ’'bridge” in British and Soviet
50
relations.
When Sophianopoulos visited the United States
in January 1947,

Demetrius N. Protopapas

of New York City

advised President Truman to "seize him and send him back to
Tito."~^

Against this background of strained international

relations and intolerance of opposing views, President Truman,
himself now a member of A H E P A , announced the "Truman Doctrine, ”
March 12, 1947.52
These international events were not expressed to any
extent in Presidential correspondence. The theme of the mail
in the period 1945 to 1947 centered on the issue of the "Megali
Idea" of territorial acquisition.

A breakdown of correspon

dence by year indicates to what extent the "Megali Idea" dom
inated White House m a i l . The increase in mail from influential
sources in 1946

reflects the increasing pressure placed on

United States legislators to support Greek territorial claims.
Mail protesting Greek internal conditions decreases in 1946
from that of 1945. This may reflect emerging communist hege
mony in the Balkans or the political climate previously men
tioned.

While overall political mail declined from 1945 to

~^Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, p. 165.
Letter, Demetrius N. Pxotopapas to Truman, OF 106-M,
Box 7 78, January 17, 1947,
52

Truman became a member of AHEPA, June, 1946; letter,
Marie L. Zaharakos to Truman, OF 206-M, Box 778, June 19, 1946.

to 1946,

the percentage of

political mail

reflecting the

"Megali Idea" increased. Table III illustrates the preponder
ance of mail supporting Greek territorial claims. These.fig
ures suggest

Greece would elicit

considerable sympathetic

support when President Truman requested aid to that country
in March 1947.“^
An evaluation of White House correspondence from April
1945, to March 11, 1947,

suggests a curious contradiction.

The volume of mail by month is higher in correspondence polit
ical in nature than that in the months evaluated for 1944 and
1945, but most striking, retained political mail in 1945 and
1946 reflected views of a right wing Greek government. Polit
ical mail for October 1944 through March 1945, reflected views
opposed to the establishment of that government.

This con

trast may be explained by a historic evaluation of the emo
tional appeal of the "Megali Idea" on Americans of Greek her
itage. In addition, the creation of communist governments in
Yugoslavia, Albania, Rumania, and Bulgaria lent credence to
the Greek government's claims of "communist" designs on that
country.

Territorial claims by the Greek government created

a political climate almost impossible to evaluate.
Nations Commission
that Yugoslavia,

53

778,

A United

found evidence to support Greek charges
Albania, and Bulgaria

were aiding Greek

Evaluated correspondence is located
"Truman Doctrine," Truman Library.

OF 206-M, Box

71-

table

III

WHITE HOUSE MAIL CONCERNING GREECE
1945 - March 1947

1946

Jan-Mar 47

16(25.0%)

3(75.0%)

Political

78(95.12%) 48(75.0%)

1(25.0%)

"Megali Idea"

49(62.82%) 42(87.5%)

1 (1 00.0%)

Opposed Internal con
ditions in Greece;
Actions of Greek gov
ernment; Presence of
British; Validity of
elections

29(37.18%)

1945

OPINIONS

Non Political

4(4.88%)

6(12.5%)

0

SOURCES

Greek American Societies

66(80.48%) 17(26.56%)

1(25.0%)

The Justice For Greece
Committee

5(6.10%)

Influential Individuals

9(10.98%) 38(59.38%)

1(25.0%)

Non-Influential Individuals

2( 2.44%)

2( 3.13%)

2(50.0%)

0

0

Organized Labor

7(10.94%)

Total Retained mail by year 82(54.677.) 64(42.67%)

0

0

4( 2.67%)
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leftist guerri1las.

But it is almost impossible to deter

mine to what extent this aid was provoked by the actions of
the Greek government in claiming territory within these areas.
vVhat is evident is that the "Megali Idea" attracted tremendous
support from Greek-Americans, and gained widespread support
from United States legislators. 55

Although there was con

siderable political mail protesting conditions in Greece,

it

was not as great a percentage as a knowledge of Greek con
ditions would warrant..

These conditions were publicized in

the United States, as evidenced by the representative articles
from periodicals of the period cited in this chapter.

One

must conclude that Americans were engrossed in their own post
war affairs, but what is also suggested is there was a devel
oping political climate that would accept any form of govern
ment in Greece as long as it could not be labeled communist.

5^
jU. S. Department of State, The United Nations and
The Problem of Greece, Near Eastern Series 9, Pubn. 2909,
(September 1947 ) , p . 23-16.
55
'The following is a partial list of legislators who
wrote Truman supporting the "Megali Idea," 1945-46; Vincent
F. Kilborn, Alabama; Pat McCarran, Nevada; W. Scott Lucus,
Illinois; Claude Pepper, Florida; Hugh D. Scott, Jr. Penn
sylvania; Hardie Scott, Pennsylvania; James Gallager, Penn
sylvania; James 0. Eastland, Mississippi; W. J. Bryan Dorn,
South Carolina? Edith Nourse Rogers, Massachusetts.
In add
ition, governors, mayors, postmasters, V.F.W. organizations,
and church officials of the Greek Orthodox and Episcopal
Churches are represented in mail supporting Greek territorial
claims, OF 206-M, Box 77 8.

CHAPTER IV

AMERICAN REACTION TO THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

Britain, having re-established a monarchist government
in Greece, attempted to broaden that government and restrain
right wing activities

in 1945 and 1946.

Yet, Greece made

minimal social and economic progress during these years.

By

1947 the majority of the population remained almost as des
titute as in the days following liberation.

Greek officials

failed to institute reconstruction programs; they instead uti
lized the appeal of a "Greater Greece" to distract the popu
lation.

When criticized for the lack of improvements,

the

Greek government charged harassment by its Balkan neighbors,
and claimed that this disrupted reconstruction.^Following World War I I , many Americans expressed sympathy for the EAM - led nationalist movement within Greece.

2

However, from 1945 to 1947 opposition to British intervention
and the Greek monarchy gave way to an increasing support for
the royalist government. As has been seen, the historic appeal

Stavrianos,
Greece: American Dilemma, pp. 176-7 9;
see also Richard J, Barnett, Intervention and Revolution: The
United States in The Third World
(New Y o r k : The World Pub
lishing Co., 1968 J, p5 109;
(Hereinafter cited as Barnett,
Intervention and Revolution).
2

McNeill, Greek D i l e m m a p. 248, maintains Greek in
surgents led a nationalist movement.
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of a "Greater Greece"

and the fear of communism frequently

altered liberal sympathy.
ciated in the

Soviet intransigence became asso

minds of many Americans

with a communistic

political system, and both were rejected and feared.

Con

fronted with British intervention in Greece and Soviet inter
vention in

the rest of the Balkans,

Americans indicated a

readiness to accept unilateral action on the part of the United
States, but Americans in 1947 also retained hope for an effec
tive United Nations.

This hope diminished as United States

off icials came to feel this nation's interests were.threatened
in the Mediterranean. The repressive nature of the Greek gov
ernment lost its

importance when an alternative government

might prove communist and Soviet-influenced.
On February 24 , 1947, Britain, claiming economic hard
ship, informed the United States government of its inability
to maintain troops in Greece after March 31.
Commons had been
Britain and Greece
Greece's aid.

The House of

advised four months previously,
expected the United States

and both

to come to

This expectation was based on a realistic as

sessment of United States interest in the Near East, and its
growing naval hegemony in the Mediterranean.

From the time

of Greek liberation, the United States had contributed approx
imately $435,500,000 to Greece. In addition to this aid, Sec
retary of State James Byrnes, had agreed to continued aid to
Greece in his

conversations with British

Foreign Minister
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Ernest Bevin in October 1946.

3

Two additional factors influ

enced the decision to request Greek aid and fill the breach
created by British withdrawal: the need for economic aid to
bolster Europe’s economy, and a desire to formalize an antiSoviet policy.
In a State Department memorandum dated February 26,
1947, Joseph Jones referred to the economic crisis in France,
China, Greece and the British Empire. Imminent economic col
lapse would cause these countries to adopt "independent nation
alistic" policies or "swing into the Russian orbit."

Finan

cially isolated, the United States would then suffer economic
depression, and excessive taxation.

Jones felt Congress and

the public were unaware of the implications involved in failing
to rebuild friendly nations’ economies.
fear of spreading

4

communism is found in

economic realities;

No reference to a
this statement of

aid must be immediate or United States

markets will disappear.

Jones was advocating haste, but not

3

Barnett., Intervention and Revolution, p. 114; Xydis,
Greece and The Great Powers, pp. 407, 476;
Harold L. Ickes,
"Truman Accused of Withholding Greek Aid Issue Till Last Min
ute," Washington Evening Sta r . April 2, 1947; Thomas L. Stokes,
"Moral Force Dormant? " Washington N e w s , March 20, 1.947; for
U. S. Financial contributions, see New York Times. March 21,
1947, all in the Democratic National Committee Clipping File;
(Hereinafter cited as Democratic Committee File).
^Memorandum for the File, Jones to Benton, Joseph M.
Jones Papers, February 26, 1947; (Hereinafter cited as Jones
Papers); Truman Library, all unpublished material is located
Harry S. Truman Library (Independence, Missouri,
and will
hereinafter be cited
by
description only).
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to preserve the

existing Greek government.

However, such

economic emphasis disappeared in his book, The Fifteen Wee k s ,
which dealt with
Greek aid.

the background of the

Truman request for

Jones emphasized postwar disagreements with the

Soviet Union, and a Greece threatened by communism.^
Official interest in announcing an anti-Soviet policy
is reflected in Presidential aide George Elsey's
Clark Clifford on March 7.

letter to

Elsey recommended delaying the

President's proposal. Greece did not warrant immediate atten
tion, and action might affect the forthcoming Moscow Foreign
Ministers Conference. In addition, time must be had to insure
a receptive public,
view, wass

but of greater importance,

in Elsey's

"There has been no overt action in the immediate

past by the U.S.S.R. which serves a,s an adequate pretext for
the 'All-Out' speech."^

The expression "All-Out speech" is

not explained, suggesting that Elsey and Clifford had previ
ously discussed

and agreed

on the need

for such a speech

defining policy toward the Soviet Union.
State Department officials worked with feverish haste,

Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 11, 135.
For texts that
find economic motivation for the Truman plan,see William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy rev. and e n l .
(New Y o r k : Dell Publishing Co., Inc. , 1962 ) , p p . 269-70. Woodhouse charges American interest in southern Europe was for
the purpose of a "bridgehead for northern expansion of eco
nomic imperialism," ; , Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 289#
^Letter, Elsey to Clifford, Clifford Files, March 7,
1947.
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not entirely due to the international situation, to prepare
a speech to be given before a joint session of Congress.

In

his memoirs, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, remarked:
"Everyone knew that the State Department was facing its last
clear chance to get a job done."^

Jones, who wrote the ac

cepted speech draft, also conveyed a personal commitment to
place the

State Department in the center of the decision
g
making process.
These men were working to regain a pre
eminence the Department had lost during the Roosevelt Admin
istration,

when its duties were

aides, military

relegated to White House

chiefs, and President Roosevelt's decisions.

The resulting request conveyed a sense

9

pf crisis in inter

national affair s , but the record also indicates a corresponding
sense of crisis in professional careers of the involved offi
cials. Converging self and national interest, and suspicions
of the Soviet Union

resulted in acceptance of a definitive

policy by Secretary of the Navy Forresta.1, Secretary of War
Robert P. Patterson, as well as White House and State Depart-

Dean. Acheson, Present At The Creation: My Years in
The State Department (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc.,
1969), p~. 2 z O ; (Hereinaf ter cited as Acheson, Present At The
Creation.
O
Jones, Fifteen W e e k s , p. 147.
9Lisle A. Rose, Dubious Victory: The United States
and the End of World War II (Oberlin: The Kent State Univer
sity Press, 1973), pp^ 245-47.
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ment e x ecu t i v e s . ^ Convincing Congress and the American peo
ple remained the only obstacle.
The problems of Greece and the

spread of communism

dominated the President's request on March 12,1947, to grant
aid.

Greek conditions were expressed in broad terms:

"There

is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn," and
"assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free
na t i o n . "^
tions,

These generalities cloaked undemocratic institu

and neglected to explore previous

utilize aid.

Greek failure to

The statement avoids specifics,

but there are

obvious contradictions. In reference to the civil war, Truman
stated : "The Greek government is unable to cope with the sit
uation.

The Greek army is small and poorly equipped" and in

danger of a "totalitarian" system being established by "aggressive"external

"movements."

12

(Aid critic Senator Glen H.

Taylor would charge that Truman's implication of outside pres
sure on a poorly equipped Greek army was subterfuge.

Taylor

maintained the 13,000 guerrillas had but scant assistance from
neighboring countries,

and that in addition the Greek army

^ F o r further information why Geeek-Turkish aid gained
acceptance,see Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade: America.
1945-1955 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 57-62 ? (Hereinafter cited as Goldman, Crucial Decade).
^ " T e x t of President Truman's Speech on New Foreign
Policy," The New York Times. March 13, 1947, in the Jones Pa
pers? (Hereinafter cited as "Truman Speech'.').

12Ibid.

consisted of 120,000 troops aided by 10,000 British.)}'*
Introducing the inevitability of an ideological clash,
Truman's speech continued * "every nation must choose between
alternative ways of life. "

Further implying that if the choice

were left to chance, peace would be threatened, and also "the
security of the United States," thus linking aid to. peace and
national security. This causative pyramid continued with the
introduction of Turkish aid.

Were Greece to succumb, "the

effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and seri
o u s . Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the
entire Middle E a s t . " ^

The tone of the speech

is crisis

oriented. Britain's role in Greece, the United Nations, Greek
politics,

and even the request for

emphasized.

Barely mentioned is the issue of military per

sonnel and assistance.
essary to win public
the request.

Turkish aid are under

These omissions were considered nec
approval and legislation to implement

15

American press coverage

illustrated mixed European

reaction to Truman's proposal; such conflicting headlines as
—

F.
Ross Peterson, Prophet Without Honourt Glen H.
Taylor and The Fight for American Liberalism (Lexington i The
.University Press of Kentucky, 1974),
88".
^ " T r u m a n Speech."
^^Thomas G . Paterson, Soviet American Confrontation:
Postwar Reconstruction and The Origins of the Cold War (Bal
timore j Hohn Hopkins University Press , 1.973 ) , p~, 1 97 ; (Here
inafter cited as 'Paterson,
Soviet American Confrontation);
Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 163, 168.
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"London Gratified

By New U.S. Stand," and

"Trumans Speech

Leaves Britons Gaping" made simultaneous appearance. Fearing
Soviet-American confrontation, British officials were quoted
as shocked at unexpected military aid to Greece. The conser
vative Times (London) typically interpreted the speech as an
attack on communism and a radically new foreign policy, while
Greek "pledges"

to preserve domestic

civil liberties were

recommended in the pro-labor Daily Herald. From Paris, Amer
ican journalist Harold Callender

reported French officials

were surprised at a plan to extend American

"frontiers" to

the accepted British sphere in the Mediterranean. Speculating
on Russian reaction, French officials expected a new Soviet
"line," disrupting the French
while Swedish

Communist party cooperation;

press reports feared world

possible military conflict.

polarization and

A Soviet Tass dispatch charged

suppression of Greek democracy, but failed to find the policy
Soviet-directed.

Speculation and amazement summarize known

European feelings.^^
Two days prior to Truman’s

speech of March 12, the

New York Times had speculated that Congress Would not act to

^ "London Gratif ied By New U .S . Stand," New York Times .
March 13, 1947; "Truman Speech Leaves Britons Gaping," Wash
ington Daily N ews. March 13,1947; "Europe is Amazed By Blunt
Warning," New York Times. March 13, 1947; Harold Callender,
"French See Perils In New U.S. Policy," New York Times. March
14, 1947;
"Scandinavia Aroused:
Truman Speech Seen Harmful
to East-West Relations," New York Times. March 14, 1947; "Mos
cow Sees Aim To 'Control' Greece," New York Times. March 14,
1947; all in Jones Papers.

31

establish an American "frontier" in royalist Greece or appropriate funds to aid the British E m p i r e . ^

Subsequent argu

ments against the Truman Doctrine included these points, but
debate centered on the bypassing of the United Nations and the
Soviet Union's intentions in Europe. The speech did not men
tion the Soviet Union by name and thus only indirectly alluded
to that nation's intentions.

18

Yet, an examination of March

news releases filed in the Truman Papers, Truman Library, in
dicates that the issue of United Nations
tions dominated public response.

and Soviet inten-

19

A consensus of radio comments following Truman's dec
laration interpreted the speech as a new United States policy
to contain the Soviet Union.

Among those finding the plan a

challenge to Soviet eff ort for world leadership were Leif Eid,
NBC

j

Gabriel Heatter and Albert Warner , MBS ; John Daly , Winston

Burdette, and Eric Sevried of CBS,*

and Earl Godwin of ABC.

Initial radio reports practically ignored the Greek political
situation and the United Nations. Exceptions were Elmer Davis,

• ^ New York Times. March 10, 1947, in the Democratic
Committee File.
^ " T r u m a n Speech"
19
Office of Government Reports:
Division of Press
Intelligence. Radio, editorial and column comment concerning
Truman's Speech were tabulated daily based on major network
and key newspapers selected for evaluation,
located in the
Conway Files. (Hereinaf ter cited as "Radio Comment," Editorial
Comment" or "Column Comment" with appropriate date; see Ap 
pendix A and B for newspapers and columns surveyed.)
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who stressed Greek corruption; Cecil Brown and Ray Henle, who
called for

United Nations action and

questioned America's

ability to bear the cost if aid were extended to other coun20
tries.
Opinion extremes are found in comparing the views
of Lowell Thomas and

Henry Wallace.

Thomas described the

speech as an attempt "to save the American way."
Vice President Wallace,

commenting on NBC,

21

Former

denounced uni

lateral action to aid a corrupt monarchy as a "betraying" of
the American "tradition,"

and suggested that United States

aid to reactionary governments would force liberal people to
22
reject such democracy and turn to communism.
During March, radio comments became increasingly crit
ical.

Winston Burdette raised the issue of ideological con

flict, cautioning

that preoccupation with communism would
23
counter opposition to fascism.
Yet the main issues remained;
speculation as to Congressional approval , United Nations rather
than unilateral action, possible war with the Soviet Union,
and the nature of the Greek government. Reports of early Con
gressional approval were dimmed by the United Nations issue.
__

"Radio Comment," March 12, 1947; March 13, 1947.
^ L o w e l l Thomas, N.B.C.,

"Radio Comment," March 12,

1947.
22

Henry A. Wallace, N.B.C.,

"Radio Comment," March

Winston Burdette, C.B.S.,

"Radio Comment," March

13, 1947.
23
14, 1947.
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Dissenting views of Senators Claude Pepper and Glen H. Taylor
centered on bypassing the United Nations.
tradiction in

the offering of funds to

Pepper found con
Greece and Turkey,

while at the same time maintaining a United Nations which was
24
financially unable to act.
In an interview on Radio Forum
of The Air, Taylor insisted no crisis existed, and the sit
uation called for United Nations action,
not United States
25
intervention.
Countering these arguments were commentators
such as Fulton Lewis J r . and Wellman Heilman who maintained that
the United Nations was ineffectual, and felt implementing aid
26
to threatened nations would strengthen world unity.
Drew
Pearson proved the chief Greek critic among radio commentators
charging political corruption and accusing

White House aide

General Harry Vaughn of removing from White House files records
damaging to George II.

According to Pearson,

accounted for United States intervention.
criticism, Martin Agronsky reported:

27

Arabian oil

In reference to

"Those who criticize are

automatically labeled wild-eyed dreamers, Wallace school lib-

^"Radio Comment," March 13 through March 31, 1947;
Claude Pepper, "Radio Comment," March 13, 1947.
75

Glenn H. Taylor , M.B.S., "American Forum of The Air,"
"Radio Comment," March 20, 1947.
7

Fulton. Lewis, Jr., M.B.S., "Radio Comment," March
28, 1947; Wellman Heilman,M.B.S., "Radio Comment," March 31,
1 94 7,
27

Drew Pearson, A.B.C.,
1947, March 24, 1947.

"Radio Comment," March 17,

&4
2Q

erals, or just plain communists."
Similar considerations were raised in March editorials
which approved immediate Congressional passage of the Truman
plan. Favorable editorial comments ranged from the Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette.

which advocated aid to

stabilize the Middle

East only in the event that the United Nations could not act,
to the extreme position of the

Philadelphia Inquirer which

asked Americans to choose between "Godless communism" or "gen29
uine democracy."
Dissent followed a similar pattern.
The
San Francisco Chronicle asked for sufficient time to consider
ail alternatives and implications,

while the communist New

York Daily Worker charged Truman "wiped his feet" on Roosevelt's attempt to
During March,

create an American-Soviet

alliance.

30

more editorials than either radio commentors

or columnists continued to approve the Truman plan. Table IV
compares key

newspaper editorials, by region,

support or opposition.

'

registering

31

1

Martin Agronsky, A.B.C., "Radio Comment," March 17,
1947.
29
21, 1947;
17. 1947.
30
24, 1947;
31

"Editorial Comment," Pittsburgh Post Gazette. March
"Editorial Comment," Philadelphia Inquirer. March

"Editorial Comment," San Francisco Chronicle . March
"Editorial Comment," Daily Worker. March 17, 1947.

"Editorial Comment," evaluation from March 13, 1947
to March 3.1, 1 947 .
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T A B L E IV

REGIONAL EDITORIAL OPINION
CONCERNING GREEK-TURKISH AID; MARCH 13-31, 1947

AREA

NUMBER EVALUATED

FAVORABLE

UNFAVORABLE

2

2

0

17

13

4

North Central

9

6

3

Middle West

8

5

3

South

13

9

4

West

10

9

1

59(100%)

44(75%).

15(25%)

Washington, D.C.
North East

TOTAL

Four black papers were also surveyed and were unani
mously opposed to any type of foreign aid.

W.E.B. DuBois in

the Chicago Defender expressed apprehension that America would
grew increasingly militaristic. The Baltimore Afro-American,
the Pittsburgh Courier and the New York Amsterdam Star News
questioned aid to Greece at a time when American health care,
education, and housing needed support.

These papers further

suggested money might better be spent to improve the American
electoral process.

Domestic need, bypassing the United Na

tions, and provoking war with the Soviet Union were key issues

86

m

these representative papers.

32

Columnist opinion divided almost evenly over the new
policy. Syndicated columnists Walter Lippmann, Eleanor Roose
velt,

Arthur Krock and Thomas L. Stokes counseled delay or

caution against

implementation.

writing for the New York P M ,

Fiorello H. LaGuardia,

was a constant critic, as was

New York Herald Tribune columnist William L. Shirer, but less
well known columnists also attacked the Truman plan. John W.
Owens foresaw a world divided into two hostile camps and even
tual Soviet-American military confrontation.
charged the
longer of

United States sought to
interest to the British,

Clif Stratton

preserve an Empire no
while George Rothwell

Brown questioned the government's creating a crisis situation
to achieve approval.

33

Supporting columnists ran the gamut

from Dorothy Thompson's plea for European regeneration based
on a

"supreme act of conversion on

the part of the United

States," to Sylvia F. Porter's claim that economic aid would
provide American employment.

Acquiescence often paralleled

Hamilton Butler's conclusion that although painful, the United

oy
"Editorial Comment," Negro Weeklies , March 14, 1947/
March 15, 1947-; March 21, 1947.
33

"Column Comment," March 13, 1947 through March 31,
1947; for a leading columnist's criticisms,.see also Walter Lipp
mann , The Cold War: A Study in United States Foreign Policy,
introduction by Ronald Steel (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1972), pp. 5-52.
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States could not escape a world role.

As Table V indicates,

column reading Americans faced a dif ficult choice in evaluating
conflicting opinions.

35

TABLE V
REGIONAL COLUMN COMMENT
CONCERNING GREEK-TURKISH AID* MARCH 13-31 , 1947“
AREA

TOTAL

FAVORABLE UNFAVORABLE AMBIVALENT
Newspaper
Columnist

Washington,
D. C.

Newspaper
Columnist

Newspaper
Columnist

9/19

4/6

2/5

3/8

North East

13/22

5/9

7/12

1/1

North Central

. 6/9

3/4

2/4

1/1

Middle West

2/3

0/0

2/3

0/0

South

3/3

3/3

0/0

0/0

West

2/2

0/0

i/i

1/1

TOTAL

35/58(100%)

15/22(3 8%)

14/25(43%) 6/11(19%)

*As a newspaper carries several bylines, the number
of newspapers precedes, the number of columnists.

n/
"Column Comment,” March 15,1947; Dorothy Thompson,
"Cblumn Comment,” Washington Star. March 14, 1947.
35

"Column Comment,”
through March 31, 1947.

evaluation from March 13, 1947
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On March 15, the New York Herald Tribune reported the
White House received over twelve hundred messages registering
"overwhelming approval" for Truman's speech.

36

Only sixty-six

letters and telegrams were retained concerning aid to Greece
and Turkey for the period March through May 1947.
these

messages are representative,

Assuming

"overwhelming approval" is

an overstatement; thirty-three approved, twenty-six objected,
and seven were ambivalent.

37

Greek corruption and an effective

United Nations were frequently discussed, but Wallace’s influ
ence as a major policy critic was obvious. Correspondents ex
pressing approval cited dislike for Wallace as sufficient rea
son, while those rejecting the President's plan exclaimed, "Thank
38
God for Henry A. Wallace. "
Greek American societies approved,
except the

American Council for a Democratic Greece,

was joined in

opposition by divergent groups

National Farmers Union and the
Society: Diciples of Christ.

which

such as the

United Christian Missionary
Ambivalent messages requested

^ New York Herald Tribune. March 15, 1947 in the D e m 
ocratic Committee File.
~^OFF 426,
Wallace File.

"Aid to Greece and Turkey," OF 1170,

38 '
Letter Muriel Rutinan to Truman, OF 1170,
March
14, 1947;
on Wallace's opposition to Greek-Turkish aid,see
Alonzo L. Hamby,
Beyond The New Deal: Harry S. Truman and
American L i b e r a l i s m (New York: Columbia University Press,
1973), p5 192, T 9 7 . Wallaces speeches against the Truman
Doctrine provoked an anti-Wallace response,
see Norman D.
Markowitz, The Rise and Fall of the People's Century: Henry
A. Wallace and American Liberalism, 1941-1948 (New York: The
Free Press, 1973J), pp. 225-26, 23 5-41.
“
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economic aid, but denounced military assistance.

Those mes

sages mentioning communism are insignif icant. Table VI illus39
trates the division m attitude.
These evaluated figures
concerning correspondence prove a poor substitute for feelings
expressed similar to those of Evangelos Halikiopoulos,

who

wrote describing the pathetic plight of the Greek people and
thanked "the American people for the great a i d . P l e d g i n g .
support while taki ng a dif ferent tone, B. R. Williams suggested
Truman might quell criticism were he "to publicly castigate
that Sonofabitch Wallace. "41 Disapproval also invoked extreme
prose, one message charging "double-talk," compared Truman to
a "comedian" and further declared

"the Greek people aren ’t

free except to starve and pay taxes."

Opposition embraced

both conservative and liberal Americans;

liberals objected

to unilateral action, while conservatives attacked cost.
M. Meyer summarized right wing opposition;

H.

"We are asked to

3 9Correspondence concerning Greece is,located OF 426,
"Aid to Greece and Turkey," OF 1170, Wallace File.
^ L e t t e r , Evangelos *Halikiopoulos to Truman, OF 426,
May 19, 1947.
^ L ette r,
24, 1947.

B. R. Williams to Truman,

OF 1170, April

^Letter,
13, 1947.

Marcelle Shubert to Truman, OF 426, April
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TABLE VI

OPINION EXPRESSED IN WHITE HOUSE MAI&
CONCERNING GREEK-TURKISH AID: MARCH-MAY 1947

FAVORABLE

UNFAVORABLE

AMBIVALENT

Humanitarian

6

Neglected United 10
Nations and fav
ored Wallace

Opposition to
Wallace

3

Greek corruption 8

Plan would en
courage peace

2

Domestic need

3

Good for trade

1

Cost

3

2

Unqualified
approval

21

Endanger peace

Individuals

30

Individuals

3
Organizations
AHEPA
Greek Orthodox
Church
Adelphotis Arah
ovition/Karyae

TOTAL: 33(50%)

21

Economic a i d ;
no military

5

Provided Greek
government
improved

2

Individuals

7

Organizations
5
Congress of
American
Women
National
Farmers
Union
American Council
For a Democratic
Greece
United Christian
Missionary Soc
iety : Disciple
of Christ

26(39%)

7(11%)
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^3
send our money to another sink hole--Greece."

Admittedly

overstated, the pathos and passion of these letters
reflected the issues that confronted America.
White House assistant press secretary Eben Ayers de
scribed dissenting mail originating in New York and Brooklyn
as

clearly inspired" and "propaganda."

44

An article appearing

in the New York Herald Tribune, entitled "Red Tinge Seen in
the White House Mail on Truman," interpreted Ayer*s remarks
as Inferring that communist sympathies inspired opposition.
Explaining that a difference exists between spontaneous ex 
pression and pressure mail, the article suggested that names
be published to distinguish those who write "to follow a
1line.1
Also written from New York was a letter from Eleanor
Roosevelt.

This message to Truman objected to an ideological

crusade and stated:
. . . I do not believe that the Democratic party can win
by going the Republican party one better in conservatism
on the home front.
Nor do I believe that taking over
Mr. Churchill's policies in the Near East, in the name
of democracy -is the way to really create a barrier to

Letter, H. M. Meyer to Truman, OF 426, April 7, 1947.
On critics see Paterson, Soviet American Confrontation, p.
201; see also Walter Lippmann, "Seeing it Through," Washington
Post, March 15, 1947.
^ E b e n Ayers as quoted by Bert Andrews, "Red Tinge
Seen In White House Mail on Truman," New York Herald Tribune,
March 15, 1947 in the Democratic Committee File.
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communism or promote democracy.

...

46

Recent Truman critics find an anti-communist stance adopted
by the Democrats in 1947, and explain that this was a result
of the Republican Congressional victory in the 1946 elections.
Communism did serve as an issue in that election, thus, the
charge of M r s .

Roosevelt that the Democratic party did not

need attempt to outdo the Republican party on this issue . ^
A series
Jones's papers
These documents,

of opinion polls

are included in Joseph

concerning reaction to the
which are marked

Truman Doctrine.

"Confidential," and only

were declassified in August 1973, illustrate the Government's
preoccupation with public response.

48

White House statements

expressing "overwhelming approval" offer one explanation for
secrecy.

By a "majority of nearly five to three" Americans

objected to foreign military aid.

Seventy-five percent had

4-6
Letter, Eleanor Roosevelt to Truman, OF 426, April
7, 1947.
^ B e r t Cochran,
Harry Truman and The Crisis Presi
dency
(Ifew York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1973),
p. 186 ; David
Horowitz,
The Free World Colossus: A Critique of American
Foreign PplTcy in the Cold War (New York: Hill and W a n g . 1 965) ,
pp. 99-100.
48

Memorandum for the File? Department of State, Di
vision of Public Studies, '"Evaluation of the Current Opinion
Situation on Greek-Turkish Problem," March 27, 1947y U. S.
Public Opinion on President Truman's Proposals for Aid to
Greece and Turkey, March 12-March 17; (Hereinafter cited as
"Public Opinion";;
Memorandum for the File,
"Confidential
Gallup Results: Greece and Turkey," March 27, 1947, in the
Jones Papers.
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knowledge of Truman's proposal,

but interpreted the plan as

economic aid to a Soviet and communist-threatened Greece; in
addition, more than "two to one" believed the United Nations
should resolve the problem. These polls indicate that press,
radio, and influential political leaders supported the Truman
49
plan.
As previously stated,
this study found press and
radio responses were actually divided on this issue, excepting
editorial comment which remained favorable.
lators!

Based on legis

initial public remarks , Congress did not spontaneously

approve the Greek-Turkish aid plan.

Of seventy-five inter

viewed by the media twenty-seven approved,

twenty-two dis

approved, and twenty-six either refused comment or suggested
alternatives

(eighteen congressmen made no comment;

eight

offered objections to such provisions as military a i d ) . Jones,
reporting in The Fifteen Weeks, stated that thirty-five con
gressmen "indicated support."

He has added those con

gressmen who qualified their support to those who completely
supported the m e a s u r e E v i d e n c e

based on government doc¥
uments, newspaper files, and correspondence suggest that both
49

Memorandum for the File; Department of State, Di 
vision of Public Studies,
"Confidential Gallup Results:
Greece and Tur-key," March 27, 1947, "Public Opinion," Jones
Papers.
“^"Congressional Statements on President Truman’s
Address Asking Aid For Greece and Turkey,"
March 12, 1947,
March 14, 1947,
"Public Opinion," pp. 1-20, Jones Papers;
Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 173-74; 'Truman’s Plan for Greece
Gets Mixed Reaction in Congress," Washington Star. March 12,
1947, Jones Papers.
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Jones and historian Thomas G. Paterson erred in assuming wide
spread support for the Truman proposal.

Paterson stated:

With business, labor, and newspaper support, with a Gal
lop poll shortly after the president's speech indicating
that about seventy-five percent of the population had
heard of the aid program and that most applauded it, the
bill passed. . . .
51
In March 1947, most Americans reacted with alarm and confusion
to Truman's speech. Ambiguous and crisis-oriented,
undeserved

success.

it achieved

Government officials hastened legisla

tive action, as congressmen and ordinary citizens expressed
reservations or failed to understand the implications.

Suf

ficient time and knowledge may have altered the course.
On April 22, the bill implementing aid to Greece and
Turkey easily passed the Senate by a vote of sixty-seven to
twenty-three.

Sponsorship by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg

and the issue of communism facilitated passage.

Conserva

tive Republican Vandenberg perceived "Communism on- the-march, "
52
and felt the Truman plan represented the "lesser of evils."
Compromising on the United Nations issue, Vandenberg sponsored
provisions which suggested eventual United Nations participa-

51

Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 173-74; Paterson, Soviet
American Conf rontation, p~, 201 ; also assuming public approval
see Goldman, Crucial Decade, p. 60.
52

Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr.,
The Private Papers of
Senator Vandenberg;. ed. with Jo Alex Morris (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), pp. 342-43;
(Hereinafter cited as
Vandenberg Papers).
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tion.

53
Leading Senate

critics were Senators

Robert Taft,

Claude Pepper, and Glen H. Taylor who objected because they
felt the plan might lead to Soviet-American war, and that uni
lateral action threatened the United Nations.
critic,

A less known

Senator Albert W. Hawkes of New Jersey, raised the

issue of the absence of public support.

Hawkes claimed Con

gressional mail proved "Americans do not understand" the is
sues.

Yet, these objections were overridden by a Senate

majority which became convinced that the Soviet Union and com
munism threatened the Mediterranean and this in turn threatened
c:/:

the United States.
Following the Senate's lead, the House approved the
bill on May 9 by a 180 vote margin. Francis Case presided as
House Chairman of the Committee

which considered the Greek

53

Vandenberg Papers, pp. 345-46; New York Times. April
23,1947 in the Democratic Committee File.
54
Henry W . Berger, "Senator Robert A. Taft Dissents
from Military Esculation," in Thomas G. Paterson, e d .. Cold
War Critics; Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in The
Truman Years (Chicago: Quadrangle Books. 1971), pp. 167-95;
(Hereinafter cited as Paterson,
Cold War Critics); Thomas
G. Paterson, "The Dissent of Senator Claude Pepper,"pp. 11434; William C. Pratt,
"Senator Glen H. Taylor" Questioning
American Unilateralism," pp. 140-61.
55
"Vandenberg Hits at Critics of Greek Aid," Wash
ington Post, April 9, 1947, in Democratic Committee File.
"^Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., Bipartisan Foreign Policy : Myth
or Reality? (New York: Row, Peterson and C o . 1957), p. 6 8 .
For anti-communist hysteria, see Lisle A. Rose, After Yalta.
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), pp. 181-85.
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aid bill.

Discounting communism,Francis Case, a Republican

of South Dakota, explained in a letter to Truman that House
acceptance

rested on two provisions:

that the Greek

and

Turkish, governments consented, and the United Nations could
invalidate aid at will.

57

Middle East oil

motivated some

votes, as did conflicting desires for peace or war, but Case
made it obvious that "support was reluctant." Summarizing his
feelings,

Case defined the measure as "stop-gap,"

adding

"The people of the United States are weary of 'government by
crisis.'

Every man must realize that no country

wise enough or rich e n o u g h .or

just plain big

. . . , is

enough to run

rr o

the rest of the world."
Greece became an uneasy
United States

foreign policy.

testing ground for the new
Revealing disillusionment,

Truman recalled in his Memoirs that "even as we undertook to
bolster the economy of Greece . . .

we were

faced with her

desire to use our aid to further partisan political, rather

57

Letter,
Francis Case to Truman,
OF 426, May 10,
1947.
Greek aid requests originated in the United States
Department of State, see Acheson,
Present at the Creation,
p. 221.
Acheson describes the United Nations provision as
"window dressing," ibid., p. 224; on legislative passage,see
U. S. Congress, Senate, 80th Cong. 1st sess., April-May,
1947, Congressional Record. XCIII, 3758-3793; U.S., Congress,
House, 80th Cong., 1st sess., April-May, 1947, Congressional
Record. XCIII, 4908-4975.
58

Francis Case to Truman.
Case discusses oil and
peace and war motives.
On war hysteria see,"'Some Congress
men Advocate Immediate War With Russia,'" Omaha World Herald.
March 13, 1947, p. 1.
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than national aims.”

From 1947 to 1949, despite gigantic

United States expenditures, Greek officials failed to elimi
nate tax evasion, black marketeering, or repressive m e a s u r e s . ^
The Truman files contain many messages asserting suppression
of the Greek labor movement, arrests, executions, and corrup
tion.

Government officials,

labor organizations, Jewish fra

ternities, and ordinary citizens joined earlier Truman Doctrine critics in protest.

61

Preoccupied with Greek civil

strife, the American Mission failed to take effective mea
sures.
Proving a Sad commentary on efforts to aid "democratic
Greece,” United States officials joined royalists in purging
press, strikes, and the KKE.

62

Commenting on these events

in February 194 8 , Congressman George Bender, Republican of Ohio,
wrote Truman expressing "revulsion” at "atrocities” committed
59

Truman, Years of Trial, p. 109.

6 0Total military and economic aid was $7 58,655,056.63
from March 1947 to March 1949.
These calculations are based
on stated figures in "Status of Appropriation Under Public Laws
271 and 793, 80th Congress, as of March 31, 1949,” OF 206-M,
Box 778.
On misuse of funds see also ”U. S. Wasting Aid on
Greece Report Revealed,” Chicago Daily Tribune, April 7, 1949.
This article refers to a report on Greece "suppressed by
Democratic leaders,” Democratic Committee File.
Also critical
see "Memorandum for the Files Regarding Greek Conditions,”
OF 426, Box 1278, July 17, 194 7.
^Correspondence concerning Greece may be found
OF 426, OF 206-M, Box 1278.
^O'Ballance, Greek Civil W a r , p. 155.
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in the presence of American military.

63

Conditions remained

unchanged and United States efforts at supervision were an
swered by claims from the Greek left and right of American
A
intervention in the internal affairs of Greece.
Investi
gating the Greek situation, CBS correspondent George Polk was
murdered in May 1948. His death occasioned charges and coun
tercharges in the’ American press.

Columnist Drew Pearson

claimed that right wing terrorists murdefed Polk, while Greek
courts convicted leftist guerrillas.

65

The United States, as

Britain, was unable to alter internal conditions or the nature
of the Greek government.

By Octoberr 1949, the Greek army

with American military assistance successfully defeated the
leftist insurgents and the civil war was over.

Succeeding

governments proved increasingly right wing and repressive un
til George Papandreou appeared liberal in comparison. Maurice
Goldbloom wrote of the Papandreou premiership of the mid-1 960* s
that

"Greeks were f reer under the Papandreou government than

^L etter,
ruary 17, 1948.
^B arnet,

George II. Bender to Truman, Of 206-M, Feb

Intervention and Revolution, p. 28.

^ D r e w Pearson, "Dead Men Tell No Tales in Greece,"
Washington Post , May 22, 1948; "Lippmann Heads Group to Probe
Death of Polk," Washington Post. May 22, 1948; "Newsmen In
quire Into Polk Slaying," New York Times t May 22, 1948; "Greek
Gets Life in Polk Slaying, Salonika Trial is Pronounced Fair,"
New York Times. April 22, 1949;
Democratic Committee File.
Harry Martin, President American Newspaper Guild, wrote Pres
ident Truman requesting Polk's deatn be investigated; Harry
Martin to Truman, OF 206-M, Kay 29, 1948.
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they had been at any previous time."

On April 21, 1967, a

right wing coup led to a Metaxas-style dictatorship under
George Papadopoulos.

This regime remained in power for over

six years, giving way to another dictatorship,
leadership of Dimitrios Ioannidis.

under the

Dictatorial government

ended when Constantine Karamanlis, right wing Greek Premier
from 1955 to 1963, was invited to form a new government.
Karamanlis recently won a parliamentary majority in the first
elections held in ten y ea r s . ^
Had the Greeks been left to settle their own affairs
from 1944 to 194 7, it is likely that a native communist govern
ment similar to that of Yugoslavia would have been created.
The Karamanlis government now faces a curious dilemma.

As

has been seen, the "Megali Idea" of territorial achievement
had tremendous emotional appeal to Greeks.

During the

decade of the 1950s, the conflict over "Enosis" or union with
Cyprus almost severed friendly relations between the right
wing Greek government and its former benefactor, Britain.
Cyprus is again an issue and it will be interesting to see if
the Karamanlis government feels itself strong enough to cut

^ M a u r i c e Goldbloom. "What Happened in Greece," Com
mentary , XLIV (December 1967;, p. 71.
^ F o r accounts of Greek politics since 1946 and
the American maintenance of a Greek right wing government, see
also Maurice Goldbloom, "What Happened in Greece," pp. 68-74;
"Greece, The Colonel Musters Out," Time, Vol. 104 (November 4,
1974), p. 42.
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United States aid and support, and if it does so, how long it
can retain power.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

During the years 1944 to 1947, first Britain and then
the United States

intervened in the

political affairs of

Greece. Complex motivation of national and personal interest
resulted in Anglo-American leaders initiating policies con
trary to views accepted by many Americans.
intervention in 1944 violated the

Initial British

Atlantic Charter of 1941

which announced the principle of self-determination for lib
erated nations.

Unilateral action of the United States in

1947 usurped a possible United Nations role. Many Americans,
when conf ronted with postwar Anglo-American involvement in the
Mediterranean, reacted with concern and dismay.

White House

correspondence supported by opinion polls for the period pro
vide evidence of public interest and concern. These documents
indicate Americans were

prepared to accept a far different

postwar world than national rivalries in Greece, supported by
Anglo-American policies, helped create.
Presidential

correspondence and polls

reflect the

views of a small number of concerned individuals and organiza
tions . Assuming that these views are representative of those
Americans knowledgeable of foreign affairs, sentiment in 1944
and 1945 supported the EAM nationalist movement. Paralleling
the views found in White House mail are those of press corre101
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spondents such as George Weller, Richard Mowrer, Leland Stowe
and Howard K. Smith, as well as the historical research of L.
S. Stavrianos.

These sources suggest

that there might be

evidence that Britain in its battle against the EAM f ollowing
World War II repressed a majority effort on the part of the
Greek people to create representative government. Stavrianos
charges that histories which present Churchill's policies as
furthering liberty in postwar Greece should be evaluated as
the result of "cold war mythology."^

Historical interpreta

tion based on royalist sympathies or national interest fail
to cloud the record when viewed through the perspective of
2
White House correspondence.
Messages and telegrams almost
unanimously condemned British policy, and praised the former
resistance fighters, the EAM/ELAS.
What is of ten termed national policy is more often the
3
policy of a very few men.
Americans writing Roosevelt reL. S. Stavrianos, "Greece's Other History," p. 12;
for a similar conclusion see ToddGitlin, "Counter-Insurgency;
Myth and Reality in Greece," in Containment and Revolution,
ed. David Horowitz (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), p p . 140-81.
2
For an example of a history reflecting monarchist
sympathy, see Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat; reflecting
views representing British national interest
is Woodward,
British Foreign Policy; for EAM/ELAS role in Greek libera
tion, see Eudes, The Kapetanios; for official United States
policy,see Winif red N. Hadsel, "American Policy Toward Greece ,"
Foreign Policy Reports, XXIII (September 1, 1947), pp. 14660.
^English historian G. D. Clayton warns the student of
foreign affairs that what is often termed national policy is*
more of ten the policy of a few national leaders, see Clayton,
Britain and The Eastern Question, pp. 244-47.
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quested that their President act

to curtail the policies of

Winston Churchill who, in the view of Lord Horan,
be alone in

his grasp of the danger

"seems to

to the liberty, of the

Greeks."^1 Churchill was almost "alone" if American correspon
dence and polls reflected the amount of support generated by
his nation's actions. Moran, as Churchill1s personal physican,
referred to the Prime Minister's vacillating moods of first
conciliation and

then antagonism toward Stalin,

and found

Churchill's feelings in regard to communism 'Jan obsession.
Yet Churchill's

success in initiating

repressive policies

toward what he believed to be a communist movement in Greece
cannot be entirely explained by his position of leadership or
his personal idiosyncrasies.
the Mediterranean,

Britairfs historic interest in

resulting from her control of India and

possessions in the oil rich Middle East, reinforced any res
ervations Churchill may have had on the desirability of the
creation of partisan communist governments.

In seeking to

protect Britain's traditional interests, the Prime Minister
failed to recognize or respect an emerging postwar democratic
movement.
Roosevelt failed to act
tion of

to prevent the implementa

Churchill's Mediterranean policies.

In answer to

^C. M. Moran, Churchill Taken From the Diaries of Lord
Moran: The Struggle for Survival 1940-1965 (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1966), p ( H e r e i n a f t e r cited as Moran, Chur
chill ).
*-

^Ibid., pp. 185, 221.
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critical American opinion, he publically declared that selfdetermination for liberated nations was a desired ideal dif
ficult to implement, and further informed the American peo
ple that there

was no actual Atlantic Charter,

series of unsigned memoranda

but only a

sent to Washington and London

for press release. The Chicago Daily News printed Roosevelt's
statements which were made at the previous days press con
ference and in addition

the newspaper declared editorially

that the Charter was unrealistic and an unfortunate display
of "politicians

enraptured by their own rhetoric."^

dential correspondence and

Presi

public opinion polls reflect an

American public equally "enraptured" by a supposed document
that they believed supported the right of liberated people to
choose their own form of government.

The consensus of this

opinion condemned British action, but signif icantly requested
United States action to counteract British designs.

Where

opinion is evaluated it indicates Americans were unprepared
for political action which

violated principles designed to

create an effective world organization of cooperating, selfgoverning nations.
A right wing, monarchist government was successfully
established in Greece.

The creation of this government by

^Chicago Daily N e w s . December 20, 1944,
p. 5, 10.
Roosevelt expected an Anglo-Soviet policy creating spheres of
influence, but indicated slight concern over December events,
see James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom
(New Y o r k : Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1970) , pp. 537-39.
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military force preceded similar
elsewhere.

action by the Soviet Union

Stalin readily agreed to Churchill's request of

October 9, 1944 to divide the Balkans.
the future,

Stalin displayed slight

nationalist movement led by the EAM.

At that time and in
interest in the Greek
Although Churchill and

the Greek right labeled the former resistance fighters efforts
as communist-inspired, Stalin displayed scant interest in the
EAM or the Greek Communist party.
for the remainder of the

His postwar

intentions

Balkans are at best surmised, but

the creation of communist political

systems in Rumania and

Bulgaria followed the British establishment of a right wing
7
Greek government.
Prior British policies toward Greece of
fered Stalin an excuse

and pretext for his postwar efforts

to establish a Soviet hegemony in the Balkans.
From 1945 to 1947,

8

the Soviet Union and the United

States moved toward an eventual cold war confrontation.

The

Milovan Djilas, Conversations With Stalin, trans. by
Michael B. Petrovich (New York j Harcourt Brace and World, Inc.,
1962), pp. 131-32, 181-82, 114; see also Hugh Seton-Watson,
The New Imperialism: A Background Book (Totowa,. New Jersey:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1971).
Seton-Watson lists Eastern
European countries to come under Soviet controlled communist
domination as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungry, Rumania, and
Bulgaria.
This control was effected between 1945 and 1948,
see i b i d.. pp. 78-81; Barnet,
Intervention and Revolution;
Barnet quotes Stalin as saying in April, 1945: "Everyone im
poses his own system as far as his army can reach," see i b i d ..
p. 102.
The British army had been in Greece seven months
by April 1945.
o

Churchill,
Triumph and Tragedy,
Witness to History, p~ 234.

p. 420; Bohlen,
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origins of this cold war are increasingly reexamined in Amer
ican historiography, and some historians find that Soviet-American
conflict was not a result of Soviet imperialism or a desire
to further communist ideology.

These scholars conclude that

the cold war resulted from American efforts to further United
States postwar interests, and that the United States and not
the Soviet Union precipated initial conflict, thus
the postwar world.

9

polarizing

However, this study finds British inter

vention in Greece an equal impetus to the impending cold war
conflict,

because the United States

refused to recognize

Soviet preeminence in Bulgaria and Rumania, while at the same
time ignoring or supporting British activities in Greece. A
reassessment of postwar actions is necessary,

but one must

consider initial British unilateral policies, and the effect
of these policies on subsequent

Soviet activities which in

turn alarmed the American leadership.
Following Roosevelt* s death, Truman and his advisors
came to' view with alarm the creation of communist governments
in the Balkans, and further seemed to fail to differentiate
between the partisan communist governments of Yugoslavia and
Albania and the Soviet-instigated governments of Rumania and
Bulgaria. As early as the Potsdam Conference in 1945, Truman
insisted that free elections be held in the Balkans and con
demned Soviet policies within those countries.

9

Supra, f’n. 43, Chapter I.

Yet, within
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a year, Truman accepted the results of two dubious Greek elec
tions.

At the same time, the Greek government's territorial

claims in Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria had international
repercussions.

As Greece aggravated its Balkan neighbors,

Anglo-American diplomats lent their support; at the same time
the Soviet Union supported the Balkan governments.

Thus,

Balkan politics aided in the deterioration of Soviet-American
i
10
relations.
Coupled with simplistic views of communism and national
divisions created in part by Balkan politics, were economic
realities.

The United States needed international markets at

a time the European economy threatened collapse.

The economic

drain of World War II and the devastation to agriculture caused
by the severe weather of 1946-47 rendered the economies of
Britain and France insignificant as future recipients of Amer
ican industrial output.

In addition the United States Navy

enjoyed unprecedented growth under Secretary of the Navy James
Forrestal who recognized that naval hegemony required a con
stant source of petroleum.

Domestic sources of oil were

unreliable, necessitating use of Middle East supplies which
in turn required supervision of pipe line termination points
in the Mediterranean.

Further complicating the political sit

uation was the personal motivation of State Department offi-

gTruman, Harry S. Truman, p. 343; Leahy, I Was There,
pp. 428-29; Kaiser, Cold Winter, p. 11; supra. fn. 46, Chapter
III.
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cials whose department loyalties precluded any effort or de
sire to create an effective world organization that would pre
empt their importance in policy formation.^

These multiple

factors from 1945 to 1947 created an explosive political cli
mate, and suggest the inevitability of a definitive United
States foreign policy

aimed at containing the

Soviet Union

and furthering United States interests.
Simultaneous with worsening Soviet-American relations
was a change in many Americans* concern for developing Greek
democracy.

Sympathy for liberal elements in Greece was sup

plemented by support for Greek territorial gains. In 1945 to
1947, a series of right wing Greek governments promoted the
ideal of a

"Greater Greece” perhaps to

population from

continuing internal

distract the Greek

economic problems and

political abuses. As other Balkan countries established com
munist political systems, the Greek government used fear of
communism as an additional political crutch. White House cor
respondence reflects the views of Greek-American societies as
well as the "Justice For Greece Committee" which distributed
literature throughout the departments of government in order
to acquire support for Greek territorial gains. The consider
able support and sympathy for a "Greater Greece" is evidenced
in the number of messages located in the Truman files, from

^ Supra, fn. 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, Chapter I; fn.. 7, 8,
9, Chapter IV; Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 224;
Jones, Fifteen W e eks, p. 9-10.

109

judges, postal officials,

state and national legislators as

well as such organizations as the Veterans of Foreign Wars.
Sympathy for Greece compounded by fears of Soviet intentions
predisposed prominent Americans as well as obscure individuals
toward policies which would favor Greece.

12

Equally signifi

cant were efforts of one ethnic organization, the Greek Amer
ican Council, to attract Presidential attention to Greece's
internal political and economic conditions.
minority of the

White House mail,

the repression of all liberal
by a reactionary

Representing a

these messages describe

political elements in Greece

oligarchy, which used

available economic

assistance to enrich.its adherents and at the same time avoided
taxation,while levying prohibitive taxes against the remainder
of the population.

The Greek American Council was placed on

the Attorney General's list of subversive societies and de
scribed "as having signif icance in connection with the National
Security!'

13

A study of the postwar Greek conditions verifies

the Greek American Council's description of conditions as por
trayed in the White House mail.

Walter Lippmann expressed

The Department of State recognized that Greece had ac
quired considerable public sympathy.
Jones verifies the
statement made during hearings on the Greek-Turkish aid pro
posal that "Turkey was slipped into the oven with Greece be
cause that seemed to be the surest way to cook a tough bird,"
see Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. T62-63.
13

Armed Forces Security Questionnaires Organizations
designated by the Attorney General, pursuant to Executive Order
104 50."
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similar conclusions in a Washington Post column following
Truman's request for Greek aid.1^
evidence,

On the basis of available

it is difficult to conclude how these views signified

a threat to the security of the United States.

Perhaps a more

logical conclusion may be that they represented opinion con
trary to Anglo-American support of the right wing political
factions in Greece.

Perhaps the Greek American Council being

listed as a possible subversive society heralded an era of
coming intolerance for opposing views.

Presidential mail for

the intervening years between Greek liberation and the announce
ment of the Truman Doctrine illustrates that Greek territorial
claims and a growing intolerance for opposing views would con
fuse intelligible evaluation of the true Greek internal sit
uation when Truman requested economic and military aid to the
Mediterranean.
In a recent study of the Truman era, historian Robert
H. Ferrell introduces a valid point concerning historical in
terpretations of the cold war.

In his essay, Ferrell advises

that historical conclusions regarding the causes of the cold
war are impossible until such time as the involved nation's re-

Walter Lippmann, ’’Today and Tomorrow," Washington
Pos t , April 1, 1947, Democratic Committee File.
Lippmann
stated:
"We have selected Turkey and Greece not because they
are specially in need of relief, not because they are shining
examples of democracy and the Four Freedoms, but because they
are the strategic gateway to the Black Sea and the heart of
the Soviet Union. ’’

Ill

cords are available lor complete research and evaluation.^
Incorporated in this study

are evaluations of Presidential

correspondence, news releases, and opinion polls located in
the Truman Papers, Truman Library. Public opinion polls, re
cently declassified in 1973 and White-House mail refute his
torical interpretations suggesting

Americans were prepared

for peacetime United States involvement in the internal affairs
of other nations.

Available documents

indicate that Truman's

speech of. March 12, 1947 defining such a policy confused and
divided American opinion.

Many of those supporting aid to

Greece and Turkey misinterpreted the implication of military
assistance; others gave reluctant support because the speech
implied that
domination,

an unfriendly political
and that this in turn

system sought Balkan

endangered the national

security of the United S t a t e s . ^ Presidential correspondence
and polls as early as 1945 indicate some American readiness
for United States unilateral action if Britain or the Soviet

15

Robert H. Ferrell, "Truman Foreign Policy: A Tradi
tionalist View," The Truman Period As A Research Field t A Re
appraisal, 1972, e d . by Richard S.
Kirkendall
(Columbia •
Missouri;
University of Missouri Press, 1974), pp. 21-22.
Ferrell also suggests Stalin instigated the cold war for per
sonal and political motives, see i bid., pp. 26-27.
.
.
Department of State,
Division of Public Studies,
Office of Public Affairs, "U. S. Public Opinion on President
Truman's Proposals for Aid to Greece and Turkey.," March 28,
1947.
Summary, point 3 states i
"Most support is based oil
the view that the program put forward by the President is nec
essary to halt Soviet or communist expansion. -But this course
is accepted v/ith reluctance or misgiving."
16
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Union took such action in regard to other nations.
the Soviet Union planned to dominate
nelles,

By implying

Greece and the Darda

the Truman plan successfully attracted support, and

hinted that valid criticism was seemingly unpatriotic.
The Department of State,

in its divisions of press

intelligence and public studies, collected all available in
formation concerning public
As previously mentioned

response to the Truman speech.

these documents are contained in the

Truman files. Included in these files is a confidential memorandum dated March 16, 1947 and declassified August 9, 1973.
This memorandum suggests the executive department utilized
all available sources of opinion in order to "sell the publie" on the Truman Doctrine.

17

of available public sentiment
Turkey

In reference to conclusions
concerning aid to Greece and

the public opinion memorandum states that the "observa

tions seem pertinent as a background to further information
activities."^ These "information activities" included press
releases stressing ideological conflict between communism and
democracy and also emphasized that the United States must act
to protect its political future by aiding resistance to com-

Jones uses the phrase "sell the public" reporting
State Department discussions in Fifteen Weeks, p. 151; see
also Confidential Memorandum for the file "Evaluation of the
Current Opinion Situation on the Greek-Turkish Problem"(March
16, 1947.
18

"Evaluation of the Current Opinion Situation on the
Greek-Turkish Problem," March 26, 1947.
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munism in democratic nations.

19

This study found slight rela

tion in the public reception of the Truman plan and its sub
sequent adoption.

Executive appraisal of public opinion was

for the purpose of releasing information believed necessary
to contrive favorable public response. Therefore,

in the case

of aid to Greece and Turkey, public opinion had an insignifi
cant role in shaping foreign policy.

The executive depart

ment responded to public opinion regarding one issue, that of
the United Nations.

Adverse reaction to the Truman Doctrine

centered on bypassing the world organization,thus the need for
provisions implying eventual

United Nations participation.

Realizing that this issue might defeat the Greek-Turkish aid
bill,almost meaningless

legislative provisions

the United Nations were included.

concerning

20

What may be learned from the White House Mail? These
messages reveal that in the years preceding implementation of
the Truman plan, Americans were unprepared for the coming cold
war confrontation

between the Soviet Union

and the United

States. On the contrary, available opinion indicated a read
iness to accept future international cooperation based on an

19
Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 150^53.

20 Ibid., pp. 180-81; see also Vandenberg Papers, pp.
345-46; Acheson, Present at The Creation, p. 224.
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effective world organization.

21

Unilateral United States

intervention in Greece resulted from actions taken by policy
makers and elected officials for a variety of reasons which
successfully circumvented the apparent public will.

Americans

were prepared to accept the United States initiating policies
which would strengthen the United Nations, and were also pre
pared for their government to grant economic assistance to
nations in actual need.

They were not prepared for the real

ities of postwar "realpolitik" which circumvented the princi
ples of the Atlantic Charter and an effective world organiza
tion .
Presidential correspondence included many references
to the EAM and its role in postwar Greece.

Research for this

study verifies that portion of White House mail which represented
the EAM as a nationalist movement attempting to create a democratic government.

22

British repression of that movement

which was followed in time by the Truman plan to support "demo
cracy" led to years of successive right wing governments and

■

21

.

.

.

Melvin Small arrives at a similar conclusion m his
recent statement, " . . . had the Russians been perceived as
conciliatory, most Americans would have approved," see Small,
"How We Learned to Love the Russians," p. 4 78.
22

The works of L. S. Stavrianos support the view that
EAM was a nationalist and not international communist-inspired
movement; see also the record of William Hardy McNeill, post
war U. S. Assistant Military Attache' in Athens, Greek Dilemma,
p. 248; McNeill further concluded the Greek right would estab
lish a dictatorship were its political power threatened by
the left, see also ibid., p. 271-72.

115

scant economic or social gains within Greece.
1967, a military
established.

dictatorship paralleling

On April 21,

that of 1936 was

When confronted with an apparently successful

attempt of the Greek left and center political parties to gain
an elective parliamentary majority, right wing military of
ficers seized control of the Greek government.
forestalled election,
may have been wrought.

As the coup

it is impossible to know what changes
But, just as the formerly British-

supported George Papandreou was labeled a communist sympathizer
in the years

preceding the coup,

liberal politicans were

charged with communism and the elective process halted.

23

From 1947 to the present, the United States paralleling
the British policy of 1944 to 1947, has granted aid to a suc
cession of right wing Greek governments.
wing intransigence

Faced with right

which refuses to relinquish

political

perogatives by incorporating a political left or center,
United States

has been forced to support

the

those political

parties favoring this natiorfs military presence in Greece.

24

Unfortunately*, if the Greek political oligarchy fails to re
tain power,
*

beneficial results of United States aid may be

2_

Stephen Rousseas, with the collaboration of Herman
Starobin and Gertrud Lenzes, The Death of A Democracy: Greece
and the American Conscience (New Yorks Grove Press, Inc., 1967),
pp. 54-70, 73-98; John A. Katris, Eyewitness in Greece; The
Colonels Come to Power
(St. Louis, Missouri: New Critics
Press, I n c ., 1971), p p . 87-107; (Hereinafter cited as Katris,
Eyewitness in Greece).

2.A Katris, Eyewitness in Greece, pp. 11-16.
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forgotten in the resulting resentment of American support of
reactionary governments.

APPENDIX A

"EDITORIAL COMMENT” EVALUATED
CONCERNING GREEK-TURKISH AID MARCH 13-31, 1947
FAVORABLE
Albuquerque Journal
Atlanta Constitution
Baltimore Sun
Boise Statesman
Buffalo Courier-Express
Burlington Vermont Free Press
Charleston South Carolina
News Sc Courier
Cheyenne Wyoming State Tribune
Chicago Times
Christian Science Monitor
Cincinnati Enquirer
Cleveland Plain Dealer
Dallas News
Des Moines Register
Denver Post
Fargo Forum
Hartford Courant
Indianapolis Star
Jacksonville Florida
Times-Union
Little Rock Arkansas Gazet
Louisville Courier-Journal

Manchester New Hampshire Union
Nashville Tennessean
Newark News
New Orleans Times-Picayune
New York Herald Tribune
New York Mirror
New York Times
New York World Herald
Oklahoma City Oklahoman
Omaha World-Herald
Philadelphia Inquirer
Phoenix Arizona Republic
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
Portland Maine Press Herald
Portland Oregonian
Reno Gazette
Providence Journal
Salt Lake City Tribune
St. Louis Post Dispatch
Sioux Falls Argus-Leader
Washington Post
Washington Star
Wilmington News

UNFAVORABLE
Baltimore Afro-American
Birmingham Age-Herald
Chicago Defender
Chicago Sun
Chicago Tribune
Detroit Free Press
Minneapolis Tribune
New York Amsterdam Star News
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New York Daily Worker
New York PM
Norfolk Journal and Guide
Pittsburgh Courier
Raleigh News and Observer
Richmond-Times Dispatch
San Francisco Chronicle

APPENDIX B

"COLUMN COMMENT" EVALUATED
CONCERNING GREEK-TURKISH AID MARCH 13-31 , 1947

FAVORABLE

Dallas News

Lynn W. Landrum

Detroit Free Press

Hamilton Butler

Jacksonville Florida
Times-Union

John Temple Graves

Minneapolis Tribune

Arthur Upgren

New York Herald Tribune

George Fielding Eliot

New York Journal-American

M/Gen. David P. Barrows
Lewis Haney
Merryle S, Rukeyser

New York Post

Edgar Ansel Mowrer
Van Devander and Player
Sylvia F. Porter

New York Times

Anne O'Hare McCormick

New York WorId-Telegram

Lawrence Fertig

Philadelphia Bulletin

Dewitt Mackenzie
Ralph W. Page

Richmond Times Dispatch

Thomas Lomax Hunter

Washington News

William Philip Simms

Washington Post

Stewart Alsop
Mark Sullivan

Washington Star

Gould Lincoln
Dorothy Thompson

Washington Times-Herald

Westbrook Pegler
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UNFAVORABLE

Baltimore Sun

John W. Owens

Chicago Sun

Kenesaw M. Landis II
Gerry Robichaud

Cleveland Plain Dealer

Jay Franklin
Spencer D. Irwin
Russell Weismann

Detroit Free Press

Royce Howes

New York Daily Worker

James S. Allen
Joseph Clark
Mike Gold

New York Herald Tribune

William L. Shirer

New York Journal American

George Rothwell Brown

New York PM

Fiorello H. LaGuardia
Max Lerner
Jennings Perry

New York Post

Samuel Grafton
Harold Ickes

'New York Times

James Reston

San Francisco Chronicle

Royce Brier

Topeka Capital

Clif Stratton

Washington News

Thomas L. Stokes

Washington Post

Marquis Childs
Walter Lippmann
Barnet Nover
Eleanor Roosevelt
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AMBIVALENT

Cleveland Plain Dealer

William F. McDermott

Denver Post

M. W. Fodor

New York Times

Arthur Krock

Washington Times-Herald

John O'Donnell
George E. Sokolsky

Washington Post

Drew Pearson
Mark Sullivan

Washington Star

Doris Fleeson
Frank R. Kent
David Lawrence
Lowell Mellett
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